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FUNCTIONAL DEPARTMENTALISM AND 
NONJUDICIAL INTERPRETATION: 
WHO DETERMINES  
CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING? 
DAWN E. JOHNSEN* 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
One of the vibrant constitutional debates at the turn of the twenty-first cen-
tury concerns enduring questions about the appropriate role of nonjudicial enti-
ties—especially Congress and the President—in the development of constitu-
tional meaning.1  The Supreme Court, of course, asserted its own authority to 
act on its interpretations of the Constitution two hundred years ago in Marbury 
v. Madison.2  Although academic debate over judicial review continues, the 
Court’s authority to review the constitutionality of acts of Congress and the 
President today is integral to our constitutional system.   
Judicial review, though, is distinct from judicial supremacy.  As growing 
numbers of commentators note, the Marbury Court claimed relatively limited 
interpretive authority for the courts: to interpret and apply the Constitution 
only in the course of resolving justiciable cases and controversies.  The Court 
did not purport to resolve whether and when fidelity to the Constitution re-
quires Congress and the President to adhere to the Court’s interpretations as 
they exercise their own constitutional powers. 
Congress and the President, too, are constitutionally obligated to uphold, 
and thus must first interpret, the Constitution.  How should they approach this 
responsibility?  Should they follow relevant Supreme Court precedent, even 
precedent with which they disagree, or may they take official action premised 
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 1. This Article focuses on the President and Congress, but notes that constitutional meaning is 
shaped as well by social movements, political parties, the states, scholars, and commentators, among 
other nonjudicial forces. 
 2. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
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on constitutional views at odds with those of the Court?  Abortion provides one 
context in which to contemplate interpretive authority: What should guide a 
member of Congress in voting on a bill that would restrict the performance of 
abortions, or a President contemplating whether to sign or veto such a bill?  
What about a President faced with how (or even whether) to enforce constitu-
tionally dubious abortion restrictions in a federal statute, or whether to defend 
the law in court against constitutional challenge?  Should the political branches 
(that is, Congress and the President) invariably seek to conform their actions to 
the Court’s then-current standard, whether it is the Roe3 strict scrutiny standard, 
the less protective Casey4 “undue burden” standard, or some future test? Or is it 
ever constitutionally appropriate for their actions to vary, for example, with 
whether they agree with the Court’s  decision in Roe or Casey? 
Such questions lie at the heart of a debate sometimes characterized as a 
choice between “judicial supremacy,” which emphasizes the need for the politi-
cal branches to defer to the Court as the “ultimate interpreter of the Constitu-
tion,”5 and “departmentalism,” which recognizes the authority of each federal 
branch or “department” to interpret the Constitution independently.  One strik-
ing aspect of this debate is the limited relevance of ideology.  Legal scholars 
across the ideological spectrum increasingly endorse roles for the President and 
Congress and processes for constitutional interpretation that are less dominated 
by the courts.  A divide does exist, though, between those academics who write 
about nonjudicial interpretation and almost everyone else.  Judicial supremacy 
is unquestionably the dominant view in United States law, politics, and society, 
including among lawyers, who study, teach, and practice law almost entirely 
from the perspective of judicial doctrine.6 
Two major developments during the 1980s and 1990s elevated both interest 
in and the practical importance of nonjudicial interpretation: President Ronald 
Reagan’s support for strong presidential interpretive independence, and the 
Rehnquist Court’s subsequent adoption, seemingly to the contrary, of an ex-
tremely strong version of judicial supremacy.  The Reagan Administration as-
serted broad and controversial interpretive authority, especially through Attor-
ney General Edwin Meese III.  The Department of Justice under Meese’s 
leadership developed comprehensive and detailed constitutional positions at 
odds with Supreme Court precedent on a broad range of issues, including abor-
tion, congressional power, federalism, and affirmative action.7  Though depart-
 
 3. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 4. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
 5. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 704 (1974) (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962)). 
 6. See, e.g., Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme Court, 2000 Term: Foreword: We, the Court, 115 
HARV. L. REV. 4, 6-7 (2001) (“It seems fair to say that, as a descriptive matter, judges, lawyers, politi-
cians, and the general public today accept the principle of judicial supremacy—indeed, they assume it 
as a matter of course.  I am certain that the vast majority of law professors also shares this view . . . .”). 
 7. See, e.g., OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, GUIDELINES ON 
CONSTITUTIONAL LITIGATION (1988) [hereinafter OLP, GUIDELINES]; OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, 
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, REPORT TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE YEAR 
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mentalist in theory and ambition, the Reagan Administration in practice (and 
under public pressure) exercised power in ways far closer to court-centered 
norms than to a strong departmentalist approach. 
President Reagan nonetheless succeeded substantially in advancing his 
agenda for constitutional change, primarily through appointing judges who 
shared his legal views and vision for change.8  Most notably, a sharply divided 
Rehnquist Court has imposed new limits on Congress’s constitutional power to 
legislate to protect constitutional rights.9  These victories for Reagan’s legal 
agenda, though, appeared to strike a blow to departmentalism.  As justification 
for its new limits, the Rehnquist Court has developed a strengthened version of 
judicial supremacy that denigrates nonjudicial interpretive authority and de-
clares that, in certain contexts, the advancement of independent constitutional 
views violates the separation of powers.10  According to the Court, Congress un-
constitutionally encroaches on judicial power when it seeks to “define,” rather 
than “enforce,” the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment through its Sec-
tion 5 authority: “[I]t is the responsibility of this Court, not Congress, to define 
the substance of constitutional guarantees.”11 
The Rehnquist Court’s new judicial supremacy fails to adequately respect, 
or even acknowledge, the role of the political branches in the development of 
constitutional meaning, but the Court seems to be succeeding in its expansion of 
judicial power.12  The public continues to welcome judicial resolution of consti-
tutional disputes, with little regard to the particular nature of the dispute,13 
 
2000: CHOICES AHEAD IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (1988) [hereinafter OLP, 
CONSTITUTION IN 2000]. 
 8. See, e.g., OLP, CONSTITUTION IN 2000, supra note 7, at v (“There are few factors that are more 
critical to determining the course of the Nation, and yet are more often overlooked, than the values and 
philosophies of the men and women who populate the third co-equal branch of the national govern-
ment—the federal judiciary.”). 
 9. See Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001) (Americans with Disabilities 
Act); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000) (Age Discrimination in Employment Act); City 
of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (Religious Freedom Restoration Act); see also Alden v. Maine, 
527 U.S. 706 (1999) (expanding state sovereign immunity in state court proceedings); Seminole Tribe v. 
Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (expanding state sovereign immunity in federal court proceedings). 
 10. See Dawn E. Johnsen, Ronald Reagan and the Rehnquist Court on Congressional Power: Presi-
dential Influences on Constitutional Change, 78 IND. L.J. 363, 387-406 (2003) (comparing the Reagan 
Administration’s agenda for constitutional change with regard to congressional power and federalism 
with the Rehnquist Court’s subsequent doctrine). 
 11. Garrett, 531 U.S. at  365. 
 12. The Court’s most recent decision in this line of cases likely will facilitate public acceptance.  
The Court continued to preserve for itself authority to define constitutional meaning, to the exclusion 
of Congress.  See Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 728 (2003) (“[I]t falls to this Court, 
not Congress, though, to define the substance of constitutional guarantees.”).  The Court exercised that 
authority, though,  to uphold provisions of the popular Family and Medical Leave Act and to signal 
that federal laws that protect women and racial minorities are relatively safe from the Court’s new lim-
its on congressional power (unlike laws that seek to protect against forms of discrimination the Court 
has not declared entitled to heightened judicial scrutiny).  Compare Hibbs, with cases cited supra note 
9. 
 13. Cf. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).  In writing about Bush v. Gore, Professor Sanford Levin-
son noted the gap between public perception and the reality that “public officials occupying legislative 
and executive roles are, as a practical matter, far more important than are judges in giving actual mean-
ing to the Constitution.”  Sanford Levinson, Bush v. Gore and the French Revolution: A Tentative List 
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while political branch disagreements with the Court are viewed with deep, al-
beit often well-founded, distrust.  Even those increasingly on the losing end of 
judicial rulings—most obviously Congress and the President, as well as progres-
sive legal advocates—remain understandably reluctant to challenge the su-
premacy of an independent judiciary that enjoys broad public support and that 
for the last half-century has played a strong and special role in the protection of 
political minorities and fundamental rights. 
This Article joins the debate over the appropriate contours of political 
branch interpretive authority.  It proposes a variation on existing theories, 
which I call “functional departmentalism”—a variation informed by past prac-
tice and the practical implications for our system of constitutional self-
government.  Functional departmentalism can help in understanding and guid-
ing conscientious elected officials as they confront constitutional issues, as well 
as the courts and the electorate as they evaluate the political branches’ efforts.  
Most challenging, and of special focus, are those constitutional issues about 
which Congress or the President flatly disagree with the Court.  This Article 
considers the circumstances upon which interpretive legitimacy depends14 and 
concludes, contrary to strong forms of both judicial supremacy and departmen-
talism, that determinations about interpretive authority require close attention 
to the particular constitutional question at issue and the context in which it 
arises.15 
Part II begins with strong forms of judicial supremacy and departmentalism.  
Notwithstanding the judiciary’s special role in protecting rights, unduly strong 
notions of judicial supremacy actually threaten individual liberty as well as 
other core constitutional values: governmental accountability, democratic par-
ticipation, and the quality of constitutional interpretation.  Undue focus on the 
courts masks the substantial influence that Congress and the President exert 
 
of Some Early Lessons, 65 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 7, 16 (Summer 2002).  Levinson wrote that Bush 
v. Gore “further entrenches the monarch-like status of the United States Supreme Court as ‘ultimate 
constitutional interpreter,’ with a monarch-like royal prerogative to ignore ordinary legal restraints 
when necessary to protect the public good.”  Id. at 28.  Though I would not go quite as far in describing 
the relative importance of political branch and judicial interpretation, Professor Levinson’s writings, 
including those regarding the differences between what he terms “catholic” and “protestant” visions of 
constitutional interpretation, have helped shape and advance the ongoing debate, including my own 
views.  See infra note 23. 
 14. This Article builds on a discussion of presidential authority to decline to enforce constitution-
ally objectionable federal statutes.  See Dawn E. Johnsen, Presidential Non-Enforcement of Constitu-
tionally Objectionable Statutes, 63 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 7 (Winter/Spring 2000). 
 15. In their study of Congress’s authority, pursuant to Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, to 
participate in the development of the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment’s substantive guarantees, 
Professors Robert Post and Reva Siegel, for example, carefully attend to constitutional text, structure, 
and history and what of value Congress brings to the interpretive enterprise.  See Robert C. Post & 
Reva B. Siegel, Equal Protection by Law: Federal Antidiscrimination Legislation After Morrison and 
Kimel, 110 YALE L.J. 441 (2000) [hereinafter Post & Siegel, Federal Antidiscrimination Legislation]; 
Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Legislative Constitutionalism and Section Five Power: Policentric In-
terpretation of the Family and Medical Leave Act, 112 YALE L.J. 1943 (2003) [hereinafter Post & Siegel, 
Policentric Interpretation of the FMLA]; Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Protecting the Constitution 
from the People: Juricentric Restrictions on Section Five Power, 78 IND. L.J. 1, 2 (2003) [hereinafter Post 
& Siegel, Juricentric Restrictions]. 
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over constitutional meaning and change, including on issues and in contexts not 
subject to meaningful judicial review.  Misguided  criticism of legitimate, even 
necessary constitutional interpretation by political branches discourages open-
ness and transparency.  The political branches do not stop acting upon their 
constitutional views; they instead operate with increased secrecy and dimin-
ished public oversight and accountability. 
Departmentalism provides an obvious alternative, but the dominant strong 
form—which emphasizes near-plenary authority for each branch to act on its 
own constitutional views—suffers from some of the same deficiencies as strong 
judicial supremacy.  Both approaches reflect and encourage arrogance on the 
part of one branch of government regarding the superiority of its own interpre-
tations relative to those of the other branches, and both denigrate the value of 
interbranch constitutional debate and shared responsibility for interpretation.  
The Rehnquist Court’s excesses should not be met with idealized views of the 
interpretive abilities of nonjudicial actors and inadequate respect for the judici-
ary’s role in upholding constitutional guarantees against hostile political majori-
ties.  The Court’s relative extremism regarding judicial supremacy  actually can 
be seen as a form of strong, institution-driven departmentalism.  At the same 
time, departmentalism proves valuable in responding to judicial supremacy’s 
shortcomings and should not be ceded to the absolutists, formalists, and ideo-
logical conservatives who in recent decades have served as its primary propo-
nents. 
Part III suggests an alternative approach that draws upon departmentalism’s 
theoretical insights, but that in application yields results closer to traditional no-
tions of judicial supremacy than to strong forms of departmentalism.  “Func-
tional departmentalism” would recognize only limited authority to act on inde-
pendent views, the contours of which are informed by functional considerations.  
The shared nature of the three branches’ responsibility to uphold the Constitu-
tion, as well as political branch practice and judicial doctrine, all support a 
highly context-dependent approach.  Two principles are suggested here to guide 
the political branches and those who evaluate their actions, each of which in 
turn helps in the development of more specific guidance.  First, the Constitution 
obligates each branch of the federal government to support the Constitution in 
its entirety, which includes a duty to respect and preserve the constitutional 
functions of the other branches.  Second, members of Congress and the Presi-
dent are obligated to uphold and promote not their personal views of contested 
constitutional issues, but the best constitutional interpretations and outcomes.  
The determination of constitutional meaning thus is a collaborative enterprise 
in which each branch should recognize its own limitations and the relative 
strengths and functions of the other coordinate branches. 
Under these principles, whether Congress or the President has the authority 
to act on independent views depends on factors that include the constitutional 
power exercised, the constitutional text or structural arrangement being inter-
preted, and the potential impact on constitutionally protected rights.  Equally 
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important are the processes followed in reaching constitutional judgments.  I 
suggest five characteristics of processes likely to encourage principled, high-
quality political branch constitutional interpretation.  The development of pro-
cesses should not be viewed solely as discretionary policy choices to be left to 
the political branches, but as integral to constitutional authority and the proper 
subject of political attention and checks.  A President’s limited authority to act 
contrary to the views of the Court and Congress is enhanced where the Presi-
dent’s contrary legal views result from a principled, deliberative, transparent 
process that appropriately respects the views and authorities of the other 
branches.  A President’s obligation for care and candor in acting upon inde-
pendent views is enhanced where there is a diminished likelihood of judicial 
checks, as in the exercise of natural security and war powers. 
Part IV examines the issue of abortion, an issue of extensive judicial in-
volvement and a context in which the Court has offered one of its strongest ar-
ticulations of judicial supremacy, claiming authority to “speak before all others” 
about constitutional meaning.16  At the same time, abortion has attracted innu-
merable nonjudicial efforts at constitutional change, typically with the goal of 
restricting access to legal abortion and overruling Roe v. Wade.17  Few issues ri-
val abortion in illustrating the limitations of judicial supremacy and the reality 
that a Supreme Court declaration does not necessarily end constitutional con-
troversy.  While abortion is an extraordinary issue, its regulation provides a rich 
context in which to explore the appropriate political branch responses to judi-
cial interpretations with which they disagree. 
II 
THEORIES OF POLITICAL BRANCH INTERPRETIVE AUTHORITY 
Some academic commentators declare that we all are judicial supremacists,18 
while others contend that judicial supremacy, at least as the Court envisions it, 
does not exist,19 and that we all are departmentalists.20  Some of the apparent 
 
 16. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 868 (1992). 
 17. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).  The political branches most often have promoted less protection for 
women’s reproductive liberty than has been recognized by the Court, as in the recent enactment of the 
Partial Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-105, 117 Stat. 1201, in the wake of the Su-
preme Court’s invalidation of a similar Nebraska state law in Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000).  
Some elected officials, though, have supported a federal Freedom of Choice Act to provide greater pro-
tection for women than is afforded by the Court’s constitutional doctrine.  See generally infra Part IV.B. 
 18. E.g., Kramer, supra note 6, at 6-7. 
 19. E.g., Keith E. Whittington, Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation: Three Objections and 
Responses, 80 N.C. L. REV. 773, 848 (2002) (“[J]udicial supremacy, at least in the strong form some-
times envisioned by the Court and commentators, is unlikely to ever exist in practice.  The courts are 
not the exclusive interpreters of the Constitution, and often are not its ultimate or most authoritative 
interpreters either.”); see also Elizabeth Garrett & Adrian Vermeule, Institutional Design of a Thay-
erian Congress, 50 DUKE L.J. 1277, 1278 (2001); Levinson,  supra note 13. 
 20. E.g., Steven G. Calabresi & Christopher S. Yoo, The Unitary Executive During the First Half-
Century, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1451, 1465 (1997) (citing authorities for the proposition that “judi-
cial supremacy has been rejected by a veritable all-star list of constitutional scholars”); Frank B. Cross, 
Institutions and Enforcement of the Bill of Rights, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1529, 1533 n.20 (2000) (“De-
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disparity actually reflects the use of different definitions or a focus on different 
groups (reflecting, in turn, the gap between the prevalent judicial endorsement 
and academic criticism of strong judicial supremacy).21  Moreover, many critics 
use terms other than departmentalism to describe their preferred theories, 
sometimes with substantially different meanings: “presidential” or “coordinate” 
review,22 “constitutional protestantism,”23 “policentric constitutionalism,”24 “con-
stitutional construction,”25 “constitutional dialogue,”26 and “populist constitu-
tionalism.”27  Others argue that judicial supremacy should not be used to de-
scribe the Rehnquist Court’s insistence on interpretive “sovereignty”28 and 
“exclusivity.”29 
In an insightful discussion of “extrajudicial constitutional interpretation,” 
Professor Keith Whittington offers definitions that are instructive and typical, 
and that also reveal the limitations of unitary definitions: “Judicial supremacy 
requires deference by other government officials to the constitutional dictates 
of the Court, even when other government officials think that the Court is sub-
stantively wrong about the meaning of the Constitution and in circumstances 
 
partmentalism now appears at some level to reflect ‘the consensus view among serious scholars of the 
Constitution.’”) (quoting Gary Lawson & Christopher D. Moore, The Executive Power of Constitu-
tional Interpretation, 81 IOWA L. REV. 1267, 1270 (1996)); Michael Stokes Paulsen, Protestantism and 
Comparative Competence: A Reply to Professors Levinson and Eisgruber, 83 GEO. L.J. 385, 385 (1994) 
(“Are we really all ‘departmentalists’ now?  Will nobody defend judicial supremacy anymore?”). 
 21. For example, Professor Michael Paulsen’s important work often is cited approvingly as a lead-
ing example of modern departmentalist theory, see, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, 1 AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 266 (3d ed. 2000) (citing Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: 
Executive Power to Say What the Law Is, 83 GEO. L.J. 217 (1994)), but virtually no one agrees with all 
of the implications of his strong form of departmentalism.  Professor Larry Kramer defines judicial su-
premacy so broadly as to include all but one of its self-professed critics (namely, Michael Paulsen, who 
disputes the binding nature of particular Supreme Court judgments).  Kramer, supra note 6, at 7-8. At 
the other end of the spectrum, Kramer argues there is “a world of difference” between judicial suprem-
acy and the Rehnquist Court’s approach of “judicial sovereignty,” which he describes as the “difference 
between having the last word and having the only word.”  Id. at 13. 
 22. Calabresi & Yoo, supra note 20, at 1463; Frank H. Easterbrook, Presidential Review, 40 CASE 
W. RES. L. REV. 905 (1990); Lawson & Moore, supra note 20, at 1270. 
 23. SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 44 (1988) (“A ‘protestant’ Constitution is a 
deinstitutionalized, or at least . . . nonhierarchical, Constitution” that entails “the community joined 
together in basically egalitarian discussion of the meaning (and demands) of the relevant materials.”); 
see Levinson, supra note 13, at 26 (“The United States, jurisprudentially, is a distinctly ‘catholic’ coun-
try in the sense that the public at large seems to accord a papal-like authority to pronouncements of the 
Court.”). 
 24. Post & Siegel, Policentric Interpretation of the FMLA, supra note 15. 
 25. KEITH WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION (1999). 
 26. NEAL DEVINS, SHAPING CONSTITUTIONAL VALUES: ELECTED GOVERNMENT, THE 
SUPREME COURT, AND THE ABORTION DEBATE (1996); LOUIS FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL 
DIALOGUES (1988); Barry Friedman, Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91 MICH. L. REV. 577 (1993). 
 27. MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 11 (1999) (advocat-
ing a system of “populist constitutional law” for the enforcement of the “thin” Constitution); id. (“We 
can think of the thin Constitution as its fundamental guarantees of equality, freedom of expression, and 
liberty.”). 
 28. See Kramer, supra note 6, at 13. 
 29. See Paul Brest, Further Beyond the Republican Revival: Toward Radical Republicanism, 97 
YALE L.J. 1623, 1623 (1988). 
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that are not subject to judicial review.”30  Departmentalism, which Whittington 
describes as “[t]he most significant historical and theoretical alternative to judi-
cial supremacy,” holds that “each branch, or department, of government has an 
equal authority to interpret the Constitution in the context of conducting its du-
ties” and “is supreme within its own interpretive sphere.”31 
 Few scholars should be characterized as either departmentalists or judicial 
supremacists without further qualification.  Very few self-described departmen-
talists argue that the President’s interpretive independence includes the author-
ity to refuse to comply with judicial orders;32 relatively few (though significantly 
more) would argue that Presidents should routinely decline to enforce federal 
laws they find constitutionally objectionable.  Similarly, relatively few judicial 
supremacists would contend that Presidents invariably must defer to Supreme 
Court interpretations with which they disagree—for example, in exercising the 
veto and pardon powers.  Virtually all would agree that when the political 
branches advance independent views, they at least on occasion enhance the 
constitutional debate.   Constitutional theory and public policy would benefit 
from attention to the details of various possible forms of judicial supremacy and 
departmentalism and to what they suggest about the circumstances under which 
it is constitutionally appropriate for the political branches to act on their inde-
pendent constitutional views. 
A. Judicial Supremacy and the Nature of Political Branch Interpretation 
The Court’s assertion, and the public’s acceptance, of supreme judicial au-
thority to “say what the law means”—at times to the point of seeming to equate 
the Court’s doctrine with the Constitution itself33—masks the myriad ways in 
which the political branches actually do influence constitutional meaning.  The 
Constitution confers on Congress and the President many powers and responsi-
bilities that entail constitutional interpretation, often on contested issues of sub-
stantial public importance.  Congress confronts constitutional issues in the 
course of lawmaking, executive branch oversight, judicial selection, and the con-
firmation of executive branch officials.  Relevant presidential powers are more 
diverse.  A President’s view of a bill’s constitutionality might influence whether 
he works for or against its passage and whether he signs or vetoes it.  The Presi-
dent also is charged with enforcing laws and sometimes faces the dilemma of 
how and whether to enforce laws of questionable constitutionality.  Under his 
 
 30. Whittington, supra note 19, at 784.  Several commentators, Whittington among them, have 
noted but not explored variability among theories of judicial supremacy and departmentalism.  Id. at 
783; see also id. at 786 (“This Article does not attempt to specify the proper scope of extrajudicial con-
stitutional interpretation, but rather simply responds to objections that would displace the authority of 
nonjudicial actors entirely.”). 
 31. Id. at 782-83. 
 32. Kramer, supra note 6, at 7 (citing Paulsen as the sole exception). 
 33. See Akhil Reed Amar, The Supreme Court, 1999 Term: Foreword: The Document and the Doc-
trine, 114 HARV. L. REV. 26, 45 (2000) (discussing possible dangers of privileging the Court’s doctrine 
over the “document”). 
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direction, the Department of Justice advances constitutional views as it litigates 
on behalf of the United States.  The President nominates and, upon Senate con-
firmation, appoints the federal judges who declare constitutional doctrine.  Last, 
but far from least, the President and Congress both possess awesome constitu-
tional responsibilities regarding the use of the United States military and the 
preservation of constitutionally protected liberties during war and other times 
of emergency. 
Not seriously at issue is whether Congress and the President should exercise 
power in conformity with the Constitution and, in the process, interpret the 
meaning of relevant constitutional provisions: clearly they must.  They should 
consider, for example, the constitutionality of legislation prior to fulfilling their 
constitutionally prescribed roles in lawmaking.  Commentators overwhelmingly 
condemn the occasional President or member of Congress who dismisses possi-
ble constitutional defects as irrelevant to a bill’s passage and appropriately left 
to the courts in later litigation.  The constitutional text and structure, as well as 
judicial precedent, strongly support the consensus that all three branches share 
the responsibility to uphold the Constitution.34 
Rather, the issue in serious dispute is whose interpretation should govern, 
and why, in the varied contexts in which the political branches interpret the 
Constitution.  This Article focuses particularly on constitutional constraints on 
political branch actions that contradict judicial precedent or that seek to change 
constitutional meaning.  How should the public evaluate such acts: Should they 
be tolerated as unavoidable (albeit undesirable) assertions of raw constitutional 
power, condemned as illegitimate (albeit sometimes unreviewable) usurpations 
of judicial power, or praised as valuable contributions to constitutional mean-
ing?  The responses most consistent with our constitutional system vary with the 
circumstances.  For example, for a President to sign into law a bill that violates 
judicially declared rights raises different (and in my view, far more serious) con-
stitutional questions than for that same President to veto a bill based on the 
very same constitutional views, equally at odds with those of the Court.  The 
broad brush of the prevalent strong view of judicial supremacy, however, dis-
courages careful attention to context and sometimes taints legitimate and valu-
able interpretive activity. 
Past practice merits close consideration.  First, the political branches do en-
gage in principled constitutional interpretation—not in ways that mirror judicial 
interpretation, but in ways nonetheless deserving of the term “interpretation.”  
Volumes of Department of Justice legal opinions (of Attorneys General and the 
 
 34. The Court routinely explains its standards for judicial review—including the presumption of 
constitutionality and deferential review of most governmental actions—as a reflection of elected offi-
cials’ responsibility in the first instance to ensure their compliance with the Constitution.  The 
Rehnquist Court continues to recite these standards, even as it sub silentio alters them and creates new 
limits on congressional interpretive authority.  See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 535 (1997) 
(“When Congress acts within its sphere of power and responsibilities, it has not just the right but the 
duty to make its own informed judgment on the meaning and force of the Constitution. . . .  Were it 
otherwise, we would not afford Congress the presumption of validity its enactments now enjoy.”). 
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Office of Legal Counsel (OLC)) attest to the principled nature of many execu-
tive branch interpretations.35  Often, though, the public does not have a basis for 
evaluating the quality of political branch interpretations or for knowing when 
constitutional views motivate action.  The exercise of some political branch 
powers, such as a presidential veto or pardon, appropriately may be premised 
on either policy or constitutional views or a combination of the two, and the ex-
ecutive branch often does not publicly release its constitutional analyses (some-
times for good reason, but other times simply for lack of public expectation or 
demand, or to avoid political embarrassment). 
Congress and the President usually adhere to the Court’s precedent, but that 
precedent itself sometimes contemplates a measure of political branch interpre-
tive independence.  The Court does not always intend its decisions to resolve a 
constitutional issue for all contexts.  Presidential or congressional action prem-
ised, for example, on a view of Fourteenth Amendment “equal protection” or 
“liberty” that is more protective of individual rights than the Court is willing to 
enforce does not necessarily conflict with the Court’s view.   Judicial doctrine 
instead may reflect that the political branches possess superior interpretive 
abilities of relevance or that insufficient justification exists for removing certain 
issues from democratic processes.36 Some independent political branch interpre-
tation falls within the sphere of independence contemplated by the Court, but 
on relatively rare occasion Congress or Presidents use the constitutional au-
thorities outlined above to promote constitutional views flatly at odds with the 
Court’s announced interpretations. 
Even regarding issues on which the courts exercise the most exacting judi-
cial scrutiny—most notably, the protection of minority and fundamental 
rights—Congress and Presidents have effected substantial constitutional 
change.  Some influences have diminished individual rights, such as Ronald 
Reagan’s views on congressional power and abortion, but others have enhanced 
rights, as in Abraham Lincoln’s opposition to Dred Scott, Thomas Jefferson’s 
 
 35. The executive branch’s legal views are set forth in opinions of the Attorney General and, since 
1977, of the Office of Legal Counsel of the Department of Justice.  For a collection of selected Attor-
ney General and Office of Legal Counsel opinions with valuable commentary, see H. JEFFERSON 
POWELL, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE ATTORNEYS GENERAL (1999). 
 36. Professor David Barron thoughtfully discusses one context in which presidential interpretive 
authority may vary with judicial expectations.  He builds on important works of Professors H. Jefferson 
Powell, Lawrence Sager, Laurence Tribe, and others to argue that Presidents have greater authority to 
refuse to enforce a law on constitutional grounds where the courts would evaluate the constitutional 
issue with rules of deference that contemplate the possibility that the political branches will reach dif-
ferent constitutional conclusions.  David Barron, Constitutionalism in the Shadow of Doctrine: The 
President’s Non-Enforcement Power, 63 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 61, 66-75 (Winter/Spring 2000); see 
also Johnsen, supra note 14; H. Jefferson Powell, The Province and Duty of the Political Departments, 
65 U. CHI. L. REV. 365 (1998) (book review).  See generally Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The 
Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212 (1978).  Even the 
Rehnquist Court’s restrictive view of Section 5 continues to recognize Congress’s authority to go be-
yond what the Court would find unconstitutional, as long as Congress seeks not to “define” constitu-
tional meaning, but only to “enforce” (that is, remedy or prevent violations of) rights as defined by the 
Court.  See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 535 (1997). 
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opposition to the Sedition Act of 1798, and Congress’s enactment of civil rights 
legislation in the 1960s and 1970s.37 
On some issues, political branch influences are primary because doctrines of 
justiciability, judicial restraint, and deference appropriately limit judicial review.  
On issues of war powers and foreign affairs, for example, executive branch 
precedent and formal written legal analyses are far more extensive than judicial 
precedent, and the courts typically give strong deference to the views and prac-
tices of the political branches.  Moreover, the exercise of certain powers, such as 
the presidential veto or pardon, are all but unreviewable.  The absence of judi-
cial review, of course, does not signify the absence of constitutional limits.  Raw 
power does not signify authority.  Even absent external constraints, the political 
branches must adhere to constitutional requirements.  Constitutional fidelity, 
though, often depends on the branches’ effectiveness in determining their own 
constitutional obligations and then exercising principled self-restraint, as well as 
on the branches’ substantial powers to check each other and on the ultimate 
power of the electorate.38  The effectiveness of both principled self-restraint and 
external political checks in turn depends heavily on the traditional values of 
transparency and accountability. 
Practice thus establishes that the political branches at times provide a neces-
sary source of interpretation in the absence of judicial resolution and a valuable 
alternative or supplemental voice when the Court has spoken. The prevailing 
exaggerated notion of judicial supremacy ignores and undermines those inter-
pretive roles.  Indiscriminate criticism may chill elected officials’ willingness to 
engage in debate and struggle over constitutional meaning.  Moreover, when 
political branch officials do act on their own constitutional views, whether by 
necessity or by choice, their accountability to the public is diminished by inade-
quate public understanding and incentives against openness.  Public advocacy 
groups and commentators at times have exacerbated incentives against candor 
through misplaced attacks on public officials that target their interpretive au-
thority rather than the substance of their views.39  Moreover, members of Con-
gress and Presidents themselves at times advance unduly strong views of judicial 
supremacy, and denigrate their own interpretive authority.40   Such  misleading 
 
 37. See, e.g, Johnsen, supra note 10; Post & Siegel, Federal Antidiscrimination Legislation, supra 
note 15; infra note 65. 
 38. Political branch lawyers share the popular tendency to view constitutional meaning solely in 
terms of Supreme Court precedent.  When I served in the Office of Legal Counsel (1993-1998), execu-
tive branch “clients,” themselves typically lawyers, sometimes would frame legal questions in terms of 
how the Court likely would rule, which necessitated explanation that the President’s constitutional ob-
ligations extend beyond judicially enforceable limits.  For further discussion regarding the role of the 
Office of Legal Counsel and of executive branch lawyers, see Randolph D. Moss, Executive Branch Le-
gal Interpretation: A Perspective from the Office of Legal Counsel, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 1303 (2000); 
Symposium, Executive Branch Interpretation of the Law, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 21 (1993). 
 39. See, e.g., infra note 91 and accompanying text (ethics complaint filed against Attorney General 
Ashcroft in connection with his expression of his views on the Second Amendment). 
 40. See, e.g., infra note 146 and accompanying text (discussing Attorney General John Ashcroft’s 
confirmation hearing testimony regarding abortion).  James Bradley Thayer, of course, famously 
warned against aggressive judicial review.  James Bradley Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the Ameri-
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representations and misunderstandings contribute, for example, to continued 
sharp controversy over such fundamental questions as whether the legal views 
of a President’s nominees to the federal courts or to serve as the Attorney Gen-
eral are relevant and proper subjects of the Senate’s consideration. 
A desirable approach to nonjudicial interpretation should facilitate the de-
velopment of standards and processes that encourage open and principled con-
stitutional decisionmaking by the political branches on issues that involve well-
developed judicial doctrine as well as those less likely to be reviewed by the 
courts.  Whether Congress and the President exceed their interpretive authority 
when they act on views at odds with those of the Court should be recognized as 
distinct from the merits of the underlying constitutional issue.  The legitimacy of 
interpretive activity should not be the subject of misguided attack.  Most gener-
ally, interpretive theory—whether advanced by the Court, the political 
branches, or academics—should not reinforce the myth that a fundamental di-
vide separates “law,” the exclusive province of the courts, and “politics,” the 
province of Congress and the President.  It should account, though, for differ-
ences in political branch and judicial interpretive processes and competencies.41  
As discussed in the next section, departmentalism helps on all counts. 
B. Strong Forms of Departmentalism 
Familiar ideological labels do not describe well the divide between strong 
judicial supremacists and the growing numbers who endorse substantial nonju-
dicial interpretive roles.  Ideology nonetheless is relevant to the various forms 
of departmentalism, as is another familiar dichotomy: formalism and functional-
ism.  Debate over nonjudicial constitutional interpretation raises a theoretical 
dispute typically at the core of such contested issues of separation of powers: To 
what extent is the Constitution’s allocation of authorities and responsibilities 
among the three branches—the constitutional system of “checks and bal-
ances”—best understood as strictly separating governmental powers?  When 
the text assigns and delimits the scope of relevant powers expressly and in rela-
tive detail, the overwhelming weight of authority and opinion directs adherence 
to that text.  Far more controversial and difficult are recurring questions about 
when, if ever, the Constitution demands a separation of powers that the text 
does not expressly  assign,  but that may be characterized as “executive,”    “leg-
 
can Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129 (1893); see also Mark A. Graber, The Non-
majoritarian Difficulty: Legislative Deference to the Judiciary, 7 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 35 (1993). 
 41. See generally H. JEFFERSON POWELL, A COMMUNITY BUILT ON WORDS: THE CONSTITUTION 
IN HISTORY AND POLITICS 5 (2002) (“American constitutionalism was wracked with deep, principled 
(at least politically principled) disagreement from the beginning. . . .  There never was an age of consti-
tutional virtue. . .”); TRIBE, supra note 21, at 254-67 (discussing democratic value of multiple interpret-
ers of the Constitution); Cornell W. Clayton, The Supreme Court and Political Jurisprudence: New and 
Old Institutionalisms, in SUPREME COURT DECISIONMAKING 15, 19 (Cornell W. Clayton & Howard 
Gillman eds., 1999) (discussing “[t]he schizophrenia between practitioner-based and academic concep-
tualizations of law” and law’s relation to politics); Post & Siegel, Juricentric Restrictions, supra note 15, 
at 3 (declaring that the Rehnquist Court’s “decisions, exemplified by Garrett, are fundamentally indif-
ferent to the subtle but fundamental interconnections between the constitutional dimensions of our po-
litical life and the democratic dimensions of our constitutional culture”). 
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islative,” or “judicial.”  To what extent should constitutional theory emphasize 
the separate and distinctive authorities of the branches and try to divine from 
the constitutional text and structure relatively stark divisions of authority (an 
approach commonly associated with “formalism”), rather than consider also the 
connections among the branches and the practical consequences and realities of 
how they govern (“functionalism”)?42 
Departmentalism’s support for political branch interpretive independence is 
rooted in the separate and coordinate status of the three branches, or “depart-
ments.”43  Presidents and members of Congress, as well as federal judges, are 
constitutionally obligated, including by oath, to uphold the Constitution.  The 
Constitution, for example, requires the President to swear or affirm to “pre-
serve, protect and defend the Constitution”44 and to “take Care that the Laws 
be faithfully executed.”45  Emphasis on the independent status of the branches, 
and the perceived need to maintain rigid lines and rules, leads many self-
described departmentalists to positions of absolute or near-absolute interpre-
tive autonomy for each branch in the exercise of its responsibilities.  Strong de-
partmentalists argue that no one branch’s constitutional interpretations control 
or require deference from the others.  With regard, for example, to every gov-
ernmental action involving a federal statute—passage by Congress, signature or 
veto by the President, enforcement by the President, review by the Court, and 
presidential pardon—each branch possesses the authority, even duty, to be 
guided by its own best view of the constitutionality of the statute.46 
Departmentalism, both in academic literature and in motivating governmen-
tal action, has come to be associated with a strong and formalistic interpretive 
approach, especially in the service of ideologically conservative substantive po-
sitions.  The presidential administrations of Ronald Reagan and George H.W. 
 
 42. Supreme Court doctrine provides examples of both, which has led to charges that the Court is 
unpredictable.  For one attempt to reconcile the Court’s separation of powers doctrine, see Office of 
Legal Counsel, The Constitutional Separation of Powers Between the President and Congress (May 7, 
1996) [hereinafter 1996 Dellinger Memorandum], reprinted in 63 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 514 (Win-
ter/Spring 2000) (memorandum by Assistant Attorney General Walter Dellinger to the general coun-
sels of the federal government). 
 43. Professor Akhil Amar conveys this concept of coordinate status by reference to the constitu-
tional “architexture”: 
[T]he general architexture of these three articles would seem to imply a basic coequality 
among the three departments. . . .  Had the document been designed to privilege the Supreme 
Court over all other entities—to affirm not merely judicial review but judicial supremacy—
surely it should have highlighted such an important point prominently and explicitly. . . .  
[A]lthough the Constitution makes the Supreme Court supreme over inferior courts within its 
own branch, it nowhere explicitly raises the Court above coordinate legislative and executive 
departments. 
Akhil Reed Amar, Architexture, 77 IND. L.J. 671, 692-93 (2002). 
 44. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 8; see also id. art. VI, cl. 3 (“The Senators and Representatives be-
fore mentioned, and the Members of the several State Legislatures, and all executive and judicial Offi-
cers, both of the United States and of the several States, shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to 
support this Constitution . . . .”). 
 45. Id. art. II, § 3. 
 46. See Johnsen, supra note 14, at 14-22 (discussing departmentalist approaches to presidential 
nonenforcement of constitutionally objectionable statutes). 
08_JOHNSEN_FINALFMT.DOC 11/16/2004  12:21 PM 
118 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 67:105 
Bush, for example, both endorsed strong forms of departmentalism,47 though far 
less in practice than in theory; Attorney General Meese most famously and con-
troversially argued that the President possesses substantial authority to promote 
his own constitutional interpretations.48  Some ideologically conservative mem-
bers of Congress and their lawyers have claimed similar congressional authority 
to legislate based on interpretations at odds with the Court’s precedent.49 
Departmentalists emphasize that the Marbury Court asserted the power of 
judicial review, not judicial supremacy.50  Judicial power to interpret the Consti-
tution in the context of resolving a justiciable case or controversy does not pre-
clude strong departmentalism, with political branch interpretive authority simi-
lar to that of the courts and each branch acting on its own views in furtherance 
of its own constitutional authorities.51  Under this view, the power to interpret 
the Constitution is not specially that of the judiciary, but neither must the courts 
defer to the constitutional views of the political branches when they exercise ju-
dicial power. 
Seemingly at the other extreme lies the Rehnquist Court’s strong version of 
judicial supremacy.   The  Court has asserted that the authority ultimately to  
 
 47. See Issues Raised by Provisions Directing Issuance of Official or Diplomatic Passports, 16 Op. 
Off. Legal Counsel 18, 32 (1992) (memorandum from Acting Assistant Attorney General Timothy E. 
Flanigan) (concluding that the President may refuse to enforce acts of Congress that the President 
views as unconstitutional).  But see 1996 Dellinger Memorandum, supra note 42; The Attorney Gen-
eral’s Duty to Defend and Enforce Constitutionally Objectionable Legislation, 4A Op. Off. Legal 
Counsel 55 (1980) (memorandum from Attorney General Benjamin R. Civiletti) [hereinafter 1980 
Civiletti Memorandum]; Presidential Authority to Decline to Execute Unconstitutional Statutes, 18 
Op. Off. Legal Counsel 199 (1994) (memorandum from Assistant Attorney General Walter Dellinger) 
[hereinafter 1994 Dellinger Memorandum]. 
 48. In a much-discussed speech, then-Attorney General Meese stated that “constitutional decisions 
need not be seen as the last words in constitutional construction.”  Edwin Meese III, The Law of the 
Constitution, 61 TUL. L. REV. 979, 985 (1987).  Rather, “[e]ach of the three coordinate branches of gov-
ernment created and empowered by the Constitution—the executive and legislative no less than the 
judicial—has a duty to interpret the Constitution in the performance of its official functions.”  Id. at 
985-86.  Meese cited for support Abraham Lincoln’s opposition to Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 
How.) 393 (1856). Meese, supra, at 984-85.  He clearly, though, advocated authority far beyond cases as 
extreme as Dred Scott, as evidenced by a series of official Department of Justice reports that systemati-
cally set forth autonomous views on a broad range of legal issues and strategies to implement those 
views.  See, e.g., OLP, GUIDELINES, supra note 7; OLP, CONSTITUTION IN 2000, supra note 7; see also 
Johnsen, supra note 10, at 389-99 (discussing these and other Reagan/Meese Department of Justice re-
ports). 
 49. Professor John Yoo has written of his work as general counsel to the U.S. Senate Judiciary 
Committee: “Congress is an equal coordinate branch and is entitled to interpret the Constitution in the 
course of fulfilling its own constitutional duty of legislating.” John C. Yoo, Lawyers in Congress, 61 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 5 (Spring 1998). 
 50. Professor Kramer has noted that “conventional wisdom” now holds that Marbury “ventur[ed] 
only that it was proper for the Court to interpret the Constitution without in any way suggesting that its 
interpretations were superior to those of the other branches.”  Kramer, supra note 6, at 5-6; see also 
Paul Brest, The Conscientious Legislator’s Guide to Constitutional Interpretation, 27 STAN. L. REV. 585, 
587-88 (1975) (“Marbury v. Madison was not premised on any special, let alone exclusive, constitutional 
function of the Court, but simply on its duty to decide the case before it in conformance with the supe-
rior law of the Constitution.”). 
 51. Professor Paulsen strikingly adapted Marbury’s most famous line: “‘It is emphatically the prov-
ince and duty’ of the executive department, no less than the judiciary, ‘to say what the law is.’” Paulsen, 
supra note 21, at 221 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)); see also Lawson 
& Moore, supra note 20, at 1268 (paraphrasing Marbury to the same effect). 
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define constitutional meaning is that of the Court, and not Congress, and has of-
fered self-aggrandizing assertions about its power as “ultimate expositor,” with 
citations to Marbury that actually provide no direct support.52  The Court’s 
analysis, while quite thin and specific to Congress’s Section 5 authority, suggests 
a more general view that when the Court speaks to a particular constitutional 
question, the political branches should adhere to that determination. 
On close scrutiny, the Rehnquist Court’s reasoning actually shares much 
with strong forms of departmentalism and might be best conceptualized, not as 
occupying the other extreme, but as an institution-driven form of strong de-
partmentalism.  The Court in Boerne, when it first announced its new version of 
judicial supremacy,53 described constitutional interpretation at some points as a 
departmentalist would: as the duty of each branch, in the exercise of its powers.  
“The power to interpret the Constitution in a case or controversy remains in the 
Judiciary.”54  So, too, Congress: “When Congress acts within its sphere of power 
and responsibilities, it has not just the right but the duty to make its own in-
formed judgment on the meaning and force of the Constitution.”55  The Court 
continued that when the political branches act contrary to a constitutional in-
terpretation the Court has adopted, “it must be understood that in later cases 
and controversies the Court will treat its precedents with the respect due them 
under settled principles, including stare decisis.”56  These portions of the Court’s 
decision could be read, not as seeking to constrain Congress’s interpretive au-
thority, but only as declaring that the Court will not defer to Congress’s view if 
presented with it.  Strong departmentalists would not take issue with the 
Court’s authority to disagree with Congress’s constitutional views, but only with 
 
 52. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 616 n.7 (2000) (“[E]ver since Marbury, this Court 
has remained the ultimate expositor of the constitutional text.”); see also Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. 
Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 728  (2003) (“[I]t falls to this Court, not Congress, to define the substance of con-
stitutional guarantees.”); id. (“‘The ultimate interpretation and determination of the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s substantive meaning remains the province of the Judicial Branch.’”) (quoting Kimel v. 
Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 81 (2000)); Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 365 
(2001) (“[I]t is the responsibility of this Court, not Congress, to define the substance of constitutional 
guarantees.”). 
 53. The Court on several earlier occasions used similarly extreme language to describe the su-
premacy of its views, but commentators convincingly have explained those statements as driven by ex-
traordinary facts.  See, e.g., TRIBE, supra note 21, at 267 (“Properly understood, both Cooper and Mar-
bury v. Madison are consistent with Katzenbach v. Morgan.”) (discussing Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 
18 (1958) (“[T]he federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution.”)); id. at 
254-67; Akhil Reed Amar, Nixon’s Shadow, 83 MINN. L. REV. 1405, 1411 (1999) (“Fear of defiance also 
helps explain the opinion’s overblown rhetoric proclaiming the Court the ‘ultimate interpreter of the 
Constitution’ (language not found in Marbury, and never appearing in U.S. Reports before the 
1960s).”) (discussing United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 704 (1974) (“ultimate interpreter of the Con-
stitution”) (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962)). 
 54. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 524 (1997) (emphasis added). 
 55. Id. at 535.  “This has been clear from the early days of the Republic” and is the basis for afford-
ing acts of Congress a presumption of constitutionality.  Id.  But cf. id. at 545 (O’Connor, J., concurring) 
(“[W]hen it enacts legislation in furtherance of its delegated powers, Congress must make its judgments 
consistent with this Court’s exposition of the Constitution . . . .”). 
 56. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 536. 
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the Court’s less measured claims that Congress encroaches on judicial power 
when it legislates premised on views at odds with the Court’s precedent.57 
The Court’s subsequent opinions emphasize the more sweeping judicial su-
premacist statements from Boerne, rather than its departmentalist-like analysis, 
but the Court’s reasoning continues to exhibit similarities with strong versions 
of departmentalism.58  Both approaches focus in significant part on locating the 
interpretive authority at issue in one of the branches and maintaining clear lines 
to separate them.  The Court not surprisingly settles on itself as interpreter, 
while strong departmentalists locate authority in whichever of the three 
branches is exercising constitutional power.  Under the approaches at both ex-
tremes, interpretive arrogance, rather than respect and deference, is a hallmark 
of the interpretive process: both the Rehnquist Court and the Reagan Admini-
stration at times have exhibited undue arrogance about their own relative inter-
pretive abilities.59  Neither strong judicial supremacists nor strong departmental-
ists approach constitutional interpretation as a collaborative enterprise, with 
each branch encouraged to recognize its own institutional limitations and to re-
spect the superior competencies of the others. 
III 
TOWARD A MODEL OF FUNCTIONAL DEPARTMENTALISM 
The three branches’ coordinate status, though central to their interpretive 
authority, alone is inadequate to sustain a strong form of departmentalism.  
Presidents and members of Congress undoubtedly must interpret, apply, and 
uphold the Constitution as supreme law, and the Constitution is more than what 
the Supreme Court says it means.  More, though, is required to establish that 
elected officials should act on their own interpretations rather than defer to 
those of the Court or each other, at least to some degree and in some contexts.  
More consistent with the constitutional structure, as well as with past practice, is 
an approach to departmentalism that also reflects certain functional considera-
tions, an approach I therefore call “functional departmentalism.”  The term 
may seem an oxymoron to some departmentalists.  Professor Paulsen, for ex-
ample, derides as “analytically incoherent” the “mushy middle that constitutes 
the prevailing consensus” under which Presidents possess only limited interpre-
tive autonomy.60  To the contrary, those who typically adhere to formalistic 
 
 57. See, e.g., Yoo, supra note 49, at 5-6 (“Although Congress may not force the judiciary to follow 
its theory of constitutional law, City of Boerne cannot compel Congress to adopt the Court’s positions, 
nor can it necessarily prohibit Congress from using the other powers at its disposal to achieve the ends 
it believes to be constitutional.”). 
 58. See cases cited supra note 52. 
 59. Some criticism of the Reagan Administration’s assertion of interpretive authority has been ex-
cessive or misplaced and would have been better aimed at the substance of the positions the Reagan 
Administration advanced than at their basic legitimacy.  At times, though, the tone of Reagan Admini-
stration reports setting forth independent constitutional interpretations exhibit undue interpretive ar-
rogance and lack of respect for both the Court and Congress.  See supra note 7. 
 60. Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Merryman Power and the Dilemma of Autonomous Executive 
Branch Interpretation, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 81, 83 (1993) (“The premises of executive branch interpre-
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modes of interpretation should recognize the special value of a functional ap-
proach to determining constitutional meaning and the possibility that appropri-
ate functional considerations would lead to outcomes that vary with context. 
The obligation to interpret the Constitution, and thereby to influence consti-
tutional meaning, is a constitutional responsibility that each branch should ful-
fill mindful of the other branches of government.  It is a power and duty shared 
by all three branches, and its shared nature suggests that it ought not be fulfilled 
by each branch acting independently within its sphere of authority, without re-
gard for effect.  Thus, the issue is not best framed in terms that typically divide 
formalists and functionalists—that is, whether one branch of government is ex-
ercising the wrong kind of power. 
Nevertheless, some strong departmentalists argue not only that the coordi-
nate status of the departments dictates interpretive independence for each, but 
also that the best possible constitutional outcomes would result from the consti-
tutional clashes and vibrant disagreement likely to result from the absence of 
deference.61  The Rehnquist Court also makes a functional claim to support its 
role as supreme interpreter: If Congress were permitted to “interpret” and not 
just “enforce” the Constitution,62 it in effect could amend the Constitution by a 
simple legislative majority and “no longer would the Constitution be ‘superior 
paramount law, unchangeable by ordinary means.’”63  Extensive commentary on 
the quality of political branch interpretation undermines the Court’s assertion, 
at least in this extreme form,64 but these, at least, are the types of functional con-
siderations that should inform the parameters of interpretive authority. 
Departmentalism should not be ceded to formalists and absolutists.  Its fo-
cus on the textual and structural underpinnings for nonjudicial interpretive au-
thority is both theoretically sound and of practical help in countering the pre-
vailing excessive focus on the courts.  The constitutional structure supports 
significant interpretive roles for Congress and the President, without mandating 
rigid lines between the branches or interpretive arrogance.  Moreover, at least 
some forms of departmentalism are consistent with interpretive independence 
premised on the strong claims of the President and members of Congress as 
elected representatives to speak for the evolving constitutional values and views 
of the American people.  When considered in context, the compelling historical 
examples some cite to support strong forms of departmentalism—most notably, 
 
tive autonomy and of judicial supremacy are, in principle, irreconcilable. Either the executive branch 
possesses the prerogative of autonomous legal interpretation within the sphere of its powers or it is 
subordinate to the judiciary; the two propositions cannot peacefully coexist.”). 
 61. See, e.g., Paulsen, supra note 21, at 329-30. 
 62. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 508 (1997). 
 63. Id. at 529 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)); see also id. (“Shift-
ing legislative majorities could change the Constitution and effectively circumvent the difficult and de-
tailed amendment process contained in Article V.”). 
 64. See, e.g., Whittington, supra note 19, at 779 (refuting, along lines similar to other commenta-
tors, the defense of judicial supremacy offered by Professors Alexander and Schauer in Larry Alexan-
der and Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1359 
(1997)). 
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the actions and views of Thomas Jefferson, Andrew Jackson, and Abraham 
Lincoln—instead constitute less rigid and extreme forms of departmentalism.65 
The precise label—one person’s functional departmentalism may be an-
other’s qualified judicial supremacy—matters far less than the identification of 
constitutionally appropriate principles, standards, and processes to govern po-
litical branch interpretation.  Two desirable attributes of interpretive theory 
help guide my consideration of such issues here.  First, Professor Christopher 
Schroeder has cautioned well against theories that set unattainable expectations 
for political branch decisionmaking: “Political theory aimed at articulating ide-
als that we should try to implement in our actual practice must necessarily per-
suade in theory and in practice.”66  While there is value as well in more sweeping 
critiques,67 this Article focuses on the relatively attainable.  Second, in this sym-
posium issue, Professor Barry Friedman reminds those who theorize about cur-
rent constitutional events to exercise “historical humility” and test theory “in 
the crucible of very different circumstances.”68  Humility and consistency are es-
sential in the development of standards and processes to guide elected offi-
cials—Republicans and Democrats, conservatives, moderates, and progressives 
alike—as they interpret the Constitution, and the Supreme Court as it reviews 
those interpretations.69 
 
 65. Some brief highlights: Thomas Jefferson explained his pardon of those convicted under the Se-
dition Act of 1798: “[N]othing in the Constitution has given [judges] . . . a right to decide for the Execu-
tive, more than to the Executive to decide for them. Both magistracies are equally independent in the 
sphere of action assigned to them.”  Letter to Abigail Adams (Sept. 11, 1804), in 8 THE WRITINGS OF 
THOMAS JEFFERSON 311 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., New York, G.P. Putnam’s Sons 1897).  President 
Andrew Jackson explained his veto of a bill to extend the charter of the Bank of the United States as 
premised on his view that the bill was unconstitutional, despite Supreme Court precedent to the con-
trary: “The Congress, the Executive, and the Court must each for itself be guided by its own opinion of 
the Constitution.  Each public officer who takes an oath to support the Constitution swears that he will 
support it as he understands it, and not as it is understood by others.”  Veto Message (July 10, 1832), in 
2 A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 1789-1897, at 582 (James D. 
Richardson ed., 1900).  Among Abraham Lincoln’s statements in opposition to the Court’s decision in 
Dred Scott: “[I]f the policy of the Government upon vital questions affecting the whole people is to be 
irrevocably fixed by decisions of the Supreme Court . . . the people will have ceased to be their own rul-
ers, having to that extent practically resigned their Government into the hands of that eminent tribu-
nal.”  First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1861), in 6  A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS 
OF THE PRESIDENTS 1789-1897, at 9 (James D. Richardson ed., 1900). 
 66. Christopher H. Schroeder, Deliberative Democracy’s Attempt to Turn Politics Into Law, 65 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 95, 118 (Summer 2002) (citing Thomas Nagel, What Makes A Political The-
ory Utopian?, 56 SOC. RES. 903, 903-04 (1989)). 
 67. See, e.g., TUSHNET, supra note 27. 
 68. Barry Friedman, The Cycles of Constitutional Theory, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS 149, 170 
(Spring 2004) (“When we devise theories of constitutional theory . . . we ought properly to interrogate 
them by asking whether they are theories we would be willing to live with under different political con-
figurations.”); see also TUSHNET, supra note 27, at 172 (“Our conclusion must consider all issues, not 
just the ones where the Court happens to be coming out on our side . . . . And it must not idealize the 
Court by saying that the good decisions—the ones we like—occur when the Court gets the Constitution 
right, and the bad ones occur when we happen to have the wrong justices.”). 
 69. For example, the diametrically opposed views of federal elected officials regarding abortion, 
ranging from the legitimacy of Roe v. Wade to legislative bans on “partial-birth abortions” to who 
should sit on the Supreme Court, illustrate the importance of humility and consistency as we theorize 
about the exercise of governmental authority. 
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 The authority of Congress and the President to act on their own views of 
the Constitution should be viewed as constrained by the following two constitu-
tional imperatives: (1) each branch must respect the constitutional functions 
and powers of all three branches of the federal government (which this Article 
will refer to as “interbranch respect for constitutional functions”); and (2) each 
branch is obligated to uphold and promote, not simply its own constitutional 
views, but principled and high-quality constitutional interpretations and inter-
pretive processes (“interpretive quality”).70  These principles in turn facilitate 
the development of more specific factors to guide and with which to evaluate 
the political branches. 
 The principles of interbranch respect and interpretive quality should be 
relatively noncontroversial and consensus-building among the scholars, gov-
ernment officials, and commentators of various ideologies who advocate a less 
court-centered constitutional culture.  Nonetheless, ideology is relevant to their 
application, as are judgments on difficult-to-assess empirical questions.  Views 
differ, for example, about what of value Congress and the President bring to the 
process of constitutional interpretation, which turns in part on what one be-
lieves are the appropriate methods and sources of constitutional interpretation.  
Those who believe that the Constitution is “dead” will find relatively little value 
in listening to the people speak through their elected representatives about the 
meaning of equal protection and liberty.  They instead rely on other sources of 
interpretive legitimacy, such as that claimed by adherents to originalism.  Be-
liefs vary, too, about the value of clear rules susceptible to consistent applica-
tion, relative to more flexible standards likely to provide stronger, more particu-
larized protection of rights.71  Even the choice of language can give rise to 
vehement disputes: should we speak of political branch influences on the “crea-
tion,” “development,” “discovery,” or “declaration” of constitutional law?72  
One’s view of the constitutionally appropriate interpretive roles of the political 
branches ultimately will depend in part on choices among competing substan-
tive values.73 
 
 70. I suggested versions of these two principles, and six factors that flowed from these principles, in 
a previous assessment of how Presidents best fulfill their constitutional duty when confronted with the 
enforcement of statutes they believe unconstitutional.  Johnsen, supra note 14, at 29-43. 
 71. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court, 1991 Term: Foreword: The Justices of Rules and 
Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22 (1992). 
 72. See, e.g., Am. Trucking Ass’ns v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167, 201 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring) (cita-
tions omitted) (“The very framing of the issue that we purport to decide today . . . presupposes a view 
of our decisions as creating the law, as opposed to declaring what the law already is. . . .  To hold a gov-
ernmental Act to be unconstitutional is not to announce that we forbid it, but that the Constitution for-
bids it . . . .”). 
 73. Professor Erwin Chemerinsky recognized that the selection of “a model for judicial review” 
“must be based upon substantive values, upon a political theory that examines how our government 
should be structured and identifies which values are so important that they must be shielded from ma-
jority rule.” Erwin Chemerinsky, The Price of Asking the Wrong Question: An Essay on Constitutional 
Scholarship and Judicial Review, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1207, 1210 (1984). 
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A. Interbranch Respect for Constitutional Functions 
The President must “preserve, protect and defend,”74 and Congress must 
“support,”75 the Constitution in its entirety, including its allocation of powers 
elsewhere.  Any exercise of interpretive independence therefore must respect 
the constitutional separation of powers and the core functions of the other 
branches of government.  Whether, for example, the President may take official 
action premised on constitutional views at odds with those of the Court or Con-
gress depends on whether doing so would unconstitutionally infringe upon the 
Court’s judicial power or Congress’s legislative power.  Again, while this articu-
lation of principle finds support in political branch practice and judicial prece-
dent and should spark little disagreement, controversy lies in its application. 
The Court has held, for example, that Congress encroaches on judicial 
power when it enacts legislation premised on a substantive view of the guaran-
tees of the Fourteenth Amendment that conflicts with the Court’s precedent.  
Significantly, the Court has described the problem in separation of powers 
terms and not simply as a disagreement with Congress on the merits of how to 
interpret the Fourteenth Amendment.76  One omission in the analysis is striking: 
the Court ignored the general separation of powers principle that it employed 
in several previous cases.  When assessing the Independent Counsel Act, for 
example, the Court rejected reliance on a formalistic search for the appropriate 
label for the type of power at issue—executive, legislative, or judicial—and in-
stead asked whether the law allowed the President “to perform his constitution-
ally assigned duties.”77  This approach of the seven Justices in the majority in 
Morrison v. Olson (in an opinion authored by Rehnquist) differs significantly 
from strong versions of both judicial supremacy and departmentalism. 
Although Morrison has been sharply criticized, application of the general 
separation of powers principle that it articulates makes eminent sense in evalu-
ating the contours of the shared responsibility of constitutional interpretation.78  
The determination of constitutional meaning clearly is not exclusively judicial in 
nature, but the constitutional structure should be viewed as imposing limits, 
consistent with Morrison’s approach, when the exercise of interpretive inde-
pendence by one branch would prevent another branch “from accomplishing its 
 
 74. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 8. 
 75. Id. art. VI, cl. 3. 
 76. See cases cited supra note 52; Post & Siegel, Policentric Interpretation of the FMLA, supra note 
15, at 1945 (“[The Rehnquist Court] has discovered an entirely new reason to renew judicial hostility to 
Section 5 authority: separation of powers.”). 
 77. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 696 (1988); accord Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 
425, 443 (1977) (“[I]n determining whether [an] Act disrupts the proper balance between the coordi-
nate branches, the proper inquiry focuses on the extent to which it prevents the Executive Branch from 
accomplishing its constitutionally assigned functions.”). 
 78. An alternate separation of powers theory could be fashioned to require more of each of the 
branches in the actual facilitation of the responsibilities of the other branches.  While I do not here en-
dorse such an approach, the accommodation principle the political branches use to govern congres-
sional requests for executive branch material would provide a good model for exploration.  Barron, su-
pra note 36, at 101. 
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constitutionally assigned functions.”79  Here especially, the debate over nonjudi-
cial interpretation would benefit from close study of the past practices of the 
political branches.  Congress and Presidents usually simply adhere to the 
Court’s views, and even where they instead have developed independent consti-
tutional views, they do not consistently act on those views.  Most striking, 
whether the political branches actually exercise power premised on independ-
ent constitutional views typically depends also on their own policy preferences 
and, further, on the particular constitutional power they are exercising and its 
relationship to the powers of the other branches.  Functional departmentalism 
better explains this variability than do strong forms of either judicial supremacy 
or departmentalism. 
Recent variations in presidential positions regarding constitutional issues of 
congressional power provide an illustration.  Differences resulted in part from 
changes in the presidency, with the Reagan and George H.W. Bush Administra-
tions promoting diminished congressional power, and the Clinton Administra-
tion defending then broad and deferential judicial views on congressional 
power.  The Reagan Administration in particular developed detailed alternative 
visions that included substantial new limits on three of Congress’s principal leg-
islative authorities: Section 5 authority, the commerce power, and the spending 
power.80  On closer scrutiny, though, changes in who held office provide only a 
partial explanation.  President George H.W. Bush’s positions varied also with 
his policy preferences.  Bush, for example, raised congressional power concerns 
in opposition to the Freedom of Choice Act, which he also opposed on policy 
grounds.81  He did not object, though, to the Americans with Disabilities Act, 
which was vulnerable to similar criticism, but which he strongly favored as a 
matter of policy and enthusiastically signed into law; that law later became the 
subject of the Garrett decision, in which the Rehnquist Court substantially lim-
ited congressional power in ways the Reagan and Bush Administrations else-
where had advocated.82  President George W. Bush has continued President 
Clinton’s defense of congressional power in the courts, even while his judicial 
appointments make the courts more hostile to his administration’s legal argu-
ments and mirror those of Presidents Reagan and George H.W. Bush.83 
 
 79. Nixon, 433 U.S. at 443. 
 80. See OLP, GUIDELINES, supra note 7; OLP, CONSTITUTION IN 2000, supra note 7. 
 81. Hearing of the Comm. on Labor and Human Res. on S. 25 to Protect the Reproductive Rights of 
Women by Providing that a State May Not Restrict the Right of a Woman to Choose to Terminate a 
Pregnancy, 102nd Cong. 8-24 (1992) (statement of John C. Harrison, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral, Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of Justice). 
 82. See Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001).  After leaving office, President 
George H.W. Bush filed an amicus curiae brief in the Supreme Court in support of the law’s constitu-
tionality.  See Statement of Former President George H.W. Bush as Amicus Curiae in Support of Re-
spondents, Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001) (No. 99-1240). 
 83. See, e.g., Brief for the United States, Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003) 
(No. 01-1368); Brief for the United States, Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743 
(2002) (No. 01-46). 
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In addition to legal ideology, policy views, and partisan concerns, Presi-
dents’ constitutional positions reflect the varied institutional interests and re-
sponsibilities of the three branches.  As a general matter, Presidents consider 
themselves free to veto legislation or grant pardons based on their own consti-
tutional views, even if those views are in direct conflict with the Court’s prece-
dent.84  Presidents also often have appointed Supreme Court Justices based on 
their legal views for the purpose of promoting constitutional change.85  Yet only 
in extremely rare instances have Presidents claimed authority to decline to en-
force a constitutionally objectionable statute,86 and their Departments of Justice 
typically defend acts of Congress that in their view are unconstitutional, as long 
as a reasonable argument can made in support of the law.87  Presidents also in-
variably have complied with Supreme Court orders they believed premised on 
incorrect constitutional interpretations, though on rare occasion they reportedly 
have considered noncompliance.88  These presidential practices reflect respect 
for the Court and Congress and are consistent with the general separation of 
powers.   
Interpretive independence is least appropriate, and typically should be con-
sidered unconstitutional, as the basis for a presidential refusal to comply with 
the clear dictates of a court order or a federal statute.  For the President to re-
fuse to comply with a direct order from the Supreme Court, at least absent the 
most extraordinary of circumstances, would gravely impair the core power of 
the Court to decide cases or controversies and would seriously undermine the 
Court’s very legitimacy.89   More contested is presidential authority to decline to 
enforce a constitutionally objectionable statute.  Contrary to a strong view of 
judicial supremacy, presidential respect for judicial power should not be viewed 
as the principal constraint on presidential nonenforcement.  Indeed, Presidents 
sometimes decline to enforce laws premised on an application of relevant judi-
cial doctrine and in the service of implementing the Court’s interpretations, 
which poses no threat to either judicial supremacy or judicial power.  The more 
relevant constraint is Congress’s legislative power: for a President routinely to 
 
 84. See supra note 65 (quoting Andrew Jackson’s veto message regarding the Bank of the United 
States and Thomas Jefferson’s explanation of his pardon of those convicted under the Sedition Act of 
1798). 
 85. See, e.g., OLP, CONSTITUTION IN 2000, supra note 7. 
 86. See, e.g., 1980 Civiletti Memorandum, supra note 47; 1994 Dellinger Memorandum, supra note 
47. 
 87. See, e.g., Seth P. Waxman, Defending Congress, 79 N.C. L. REV. 1073 (2001). 
 88. See, e.g., PAUL BREST, SANFORD LEVINSON, JACK M. BALKIN, & AKHIL REED AMAR, 
PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING: CASES AND MATERIALS 20 (4th ed. Supp. 2004) 
(citing evidence that President Franklin D. Roosevelt would have executed suspected Nazi saboteurs 
regardless of the Court’s decision in Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942)).  
 89. Most proponents of strong departmentalism concede that the constitutional structure contem-
plates presidential adherence to court orders.  See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi, Caesarism, Departmenta-
lism, and Professor Paulsen, 83 MINN. L. REV. 1421, 1433 (1999) (“The Framers were right to legally 
bind the President to execute court judgments absent a clear mistake just as they were right to in other 
respects give all three branches . . . the co-equal power to enforce and interpret the Constitution.”); see 
also Lawson & Moore, supra note 20, at 1314-27. 
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refuse to comply with any law he believes is unconstitutional would be inconsis-
tent with the constitutionally prescribed process for lawmaking, which affords 
Congress final say on what becomes law.  While Presidents may use the power 
of the veto to block unconstitutional bills, Congress possesses the ultimate 
power to override that veto and may do so premised on a disagreement with the 
President over the bill’s constitutionality.90 
With these exceptions of court orders and enforcement of statutes, the exer-
cise of presidential power premised on independent constitutional views typi-
cally does not impair judicial or legislative power.  Nor, contrary to the 
Rehnquist Court’s suggestions, does Congress unconstitutionally undermine ju-
dicial power when it legislates based on a constitutional view that differs from 
judicial precedent.  Whether such acts of interpretive independence are consti-
tutionally appropriate should depend on other factors, especially what will best 
uphold the Constitution and promote interpretive quality.  A constitutionally 
based veto, for example, accompanied by an explanation of the President’s 
views, promotes interbranch dialogue about constitutional meaning in a manner 
transparent to the public and consistent with the Constitution’s allocation of 
lawmaking powers, without imposing new legal requirements on private citizens 
premised on a contested constitutional view.  Far more difficult is whether Con-
gress should pass and the President should sign legislation that is premised on a 
constitutional view inconsistent with the Court’s announced views to the detri-
ment of individual rights. 
Given that the executive branch’s constitutional views depend in part on the 
specific authority being exercised, the executive branch occasionally may, in the 
exercise of different constitutional responsibilities, adopt conflicting positions 
on the same issue under the same President.  The Department of Justice, for 
example, routinely raises constitutional concerns about pending legislation in an 
effort to convince Congress to correct defects prior to passage.  Sometimes 
those views are cited against the Department when it takes the contrary posi-
tion in defense of the constitutionality of a federal law.  Attorney General John 
Ashcroft became the target of an ethics complaint when he sent a letter to the 
National Rifle Association expressing views on the proper interpretation of the 
Second Amendment that allegedly conflicted with positions the Department of 
Justice was taking in litigation.91 
Does an Attorney General (or President) act unethically or unconstitution-
ally by endorsing a constitutional position that conflicts with arguments his De-
partment of Justice has offered a court in defense of an act of Congress?  The 
answer must be no.  Conflicting constitutional interpretations offered under the 
same President may be entirely appropriate when in pursuit of different respon-
sibilities.  Nor should the Department of Justice, for example, shade constitu-
 
 90. See Johnsen, supra note 14 (discussing limited circumstances in which presidential nonen-
forcement may be constitutionally appropriate). 
 91. The complaint was filed by the Brady Center and Common Cause.  The Bush Administration 
subsequently changed its position in litigation. 
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tional concerns about pending legislation because Congress might pass the law 
without making recommended changes and the Department’s views might be 
cited against it in court.  To conclude otherwise would threaten the quality of 
lawmaking and constitutional decisionmaking as well as governmental openness 
and accountability. 
President Bush acts appropriately by having his Department of Justice con-
tinue the executive branch tradition of defending Congress before the courts 
(though he is not constitutionally compelled to do so) even if he, like President 
Reagan, personally supports a more limited view of congressional power.  That 
his lawyers assert a position in court does not limit his authority, or the author-
ity of his Attorney General, to espouse a conflicting position elsewhere.  Presi-
dent Bush, in fact, has nominated and appointed judges who have endorsed ex-
ceedingly narrow views of congressional power at odds with those his 
administration’s lawyers have advanced in court.  President Bush possesses the 
authority to nominate judges based on their legal views, and the Senate just as 
surely is entrusted with the responsibility to consider those same views in the 
exercise of its advise-and-consent role.  
B. Interpretive Quality 
Congress and the President are constitutionally obligated to “uphold” the 
Constitution, which is distinct from their interpretations of the Constitution 
(just as the Constitution is distinct from judicial doctrine).  The political 
branches should exercise interpretive independence only to the extent that it ef-
fectively promotes the Constitution as best interpreted, and not simply their 
own constitutional views.  This distinction is consequential, though enormous 
difficulties and contention surround the evaluation of interpretive quality.  On 
the one hand, the recognition that elected officials acting autonomously will not 
invariably reach the best constitutional interpretations suggests that context 
matters and that some degree of deference in some circumstances may be con-
stitutionally indicated.  All three branches should respect the considered consti-
tutional views of the others in light of their “comparative institutional compe-
tenc[ies].”92  On the other hand, recognition that in many circumstances the 
courts will provide little or no meaningful review or guidance, and in other cir-
cumstances actually will anticipate a substantial political branch role, highlights 
that the question is not if, but when and how, the political branches should ex-
ercise interpretive independence. 
Behind the public’s acceptance of the Court’s occasional self-aggrandizing 
statements of strong judicial supremacy, and even its resolution of a presidential 
election, lies distrust of political branch constitutional interpretation as unprin-
cipled and improperly motivated by politics.93  The Court has alluded to essen-
 
 92. Christopher L. Eisgruber, The Most Competent Branches: A Response to Professor Paulsen, 83 
GEO. L.J. 347, 348 (1994). 
 93. See generally Schroeder, supra note 66 (discussing the public’s views on politics and elected of-
ficials and citing relevant poll results). 
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tially that same fear through its references to “shifting legislative majorities” 
that would deprive the Constitution of its status as “superior paramount law, 
unchangeable by ordinary means.”94  Commentators’ assessments of the 
branches’ comparative interpretive competencies vary widely, in part based on 
legal ideology and methodology preferences.95 
My own view is that the public’s (and the Court’s) fears are well founded, 
but not well addressed by the prevalent law/politics dichotomy that assigns law 
to the courts.  Experience belies a sharp distinction: political branch influences 
on constitutional meaning are extensive and unavoidable, and the involvement 
of what sometimes is described as “high” politics has proven essential to the 
preservation of our constitutional structure and the promotion of our constitu-
tional ideals.96  Although the political branches clearly are capable of principled 
and valuable interpretation, the courts should continue to play a special, though 
not exclusive, interpretive role, particularly with regard to the protection of 
constitutional rights.97  For reasons that underlie judicial doctrine, the courts 
should not ordinarily or easily permit the political branches to afford less pro-
tection to minority or fundamental rights than the courts deem warranted, but 
the same justifications for searching judicial review do not apply when the po-
litical branches choose to afford rights heightened protection.98  More generally, 
 
 94. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 529 (1997) (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 
Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)). 
 95. Professor Mark Tushnet has warned that both formalists and functionalists tend toward ideali-
zation of preferred interpreters: 
The formalists appeal to the idealization of constitutional law as real law, in which specialists 
in law attend carefully to the words and architecture of the Constitution. 
. . . . 
The functionalists, though, have their own difficulties.  In their favor, they appeal to another 
dimension of our legal culture, the realistic assessment of politics as it actually is.  Yet they of-
fer an idealized version of the real world of politics, because they cannot work enough about 
that world into judicial opinions. 
Mark Tushnet, The Sentencing Commission and Constitutional Theory: Bowls and Plateaus in Separa-
tion of Powers Theory, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 581, 604-05 (1992). 
 96. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Understanding the Constitutional Revolution, 87 
VA. L. REV. 1045 (2001).  For an extraordinarily rich historical analysis of constitutional law as “an his-
torically extended tradition of argument, a means (indeed, a central means) by which this political soci-
ety has debated an ever-shifting set of political issues,” see POWELL, supra note 41, at 6; see also 
Kramer, supra note 6; Post & Siegel, Federal Antidiscrimination Legislation, supra note 15; Post & Sie-
gel, Juricentric Restrictions, supra note 15; Post & Siegel, Policentric Interpretation of the FMLA, supra 
note 15. 
 97. My own experience at the Department of Justice, working with many exceptional lawyers and 
under the leadership of Attorney General Janet Reno and Assistant Attorney General Walter Dellin-
ger, established to my satisfaction that the quality of executive branch interpretation can rival that of 
the Supreme Court.  At the same time, I believe that the quality of executive branch interpretation, 
across issues and across administrations, may be less consistently optimal than that of the Court.  The 
Court’s doctrine at times may suffer from institutional biases, as evidenced by the Rehnquist Court’s 
strong declarations of judicial supremacy.  Of greater concern, though, especially absent the stabilizing 
influence of significant deference to the Court: “A tendency to augment presidential power and allow 
policy and political considerations to influence constitutional interpretation—or, at a minimum, 
whether to raise genuine constitutional objections in support of policy goals—inheres in the institution 
of the presidency.”  Johnsen, supra note 14, at 41. 
 98. Extensive academic commentary, as well as judicial precedent—too extensive to more than 
briefly note here—explore why and to what extent the judiciary should seek to guarantee at least a 
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while the courts alone do not determine constitutional meaning, when they do 
squarely address an issue, a practice of some measure of deference to that doc-
trine promotes principled political branch interpretations.  At a minimum, 
whenever Congress or the President exercises authority premised on constitu-
tional views at odds with the Court, the processes of political branch decision-
making should ensure careful consideration of that doctrine and a detailed pub-
lic explanation of the basis for disagreement. 
Regardless of which branch engages in constitutional interpretation, law 
must not be reduced simply to politics, even as we struggle to define what dis-
tinguishes law from politics.  Professor Sanford Levinson has put it well: 
“[W]hoever claims the mantle of constitutional interpreter must present a plau-
sible notion of how (or whether) proffered interpretations differ from unmedi-
ated political preference.”99  Professor Levinson also has correctly urged atten-
tion to the processes that govern constitutional decisionmaking by the political 
branches.100  The Rehnquist Court is wrong to expect Congress to act like a 
lower court, but the political branches should adhere to processes that encour-
age principled interpretation and should defer to the Court, and also to each 
other, to the extent deference promotes interpretive quality.  The development 
of appropriate processes is best viewed not as merely a policy choice to be left 
to the discretion of each official, but as integral to the constitutional authority 
of Congress and the President to take official action premised on independent 
interpretations.  Among the characteristics especially desirable in the processes 
that guide the President are deliberativeness, transparency, humility, variability, 
and attainability. 
1. Deliberativeness 
Professor Harold Koh and other former attorneys from the Office of Legal 
Counsel have noted the importance of processes that promote principled delib-
eration as OLC fulfills its responsibilities as legal advisor to the executive 
 
floor of protection for various constitutional rights against the infringement of political majorities.  
Much commentary focuses on the merits of the “one-way ratchet” approach of Katzenbach v. Morgan, 
384 U.S. 641, 651 n.10 (1966), under which Congress would be free to exercise its Section 5 authority to 
afford more, but not less, extensive protection of rights than that provided by the courts.  I generally 
agree with those who support enhanced congressional authority to provide stronger protections, though 
I recognize in some instances this will be complicated by the presence of competing claims to constitu-
tional protection, as in the cases of abortion (potential fetal life) and affirmative action (nonbeneficiar-
ies).  See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747, 826 (1999) (“[T]he most sen-
sible reading of the Fourteenth Amendment would involve both courts and Congress in the task of 
protecting truly fundamental rights against states, with states generally held to whichever standard was 
stricter—more protective of fundamental freedoms—in any given instance.”). 
 99. Levinson, supra note 13, at 16.   
 100. See, e.g., Sanford Levinson, Constitutional Protestantism in Theory and Practice: Two Questions 
for Michael Stokes Paulsen and One for His Critics, 83 GEO. L.J. 373, 379 (1994); see also PAUL BREST, 
SANFORD LEVINSON, J.M. BALKIN & AKHIL REED AMAR, PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
DECISIONMAKING: CASES AND MATERIALS (4th ed. 2000); LOUIS FISHER & NEAL DEVINS, 
POLITICAL DYNAMICS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (3rd ed. 2001); Brest, supra note 50; Paul Brest, 
Congress as Constitutional Decisionmaker and Its Power to Counter Judicial Doctrine, 21 GA. L. REV. 
57 (1986); Johnsen, supra note 14, at 25-29. 
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branch on behalf of the Attorney General.101  While variations across admini-
strations may be substantial, OLC often has followed a tradition of delibera-
tiveness that transcends politics, fostered by “informal procedural norms de-
signed specifically to protect its legal judgments from the winds of political 
pressure and expediency that buffet its executive branch clients.”102  Such norms 
should be encouraged and regularized.  During the Clinton Administration, for 
example, OLC followed a “two-deputy review” process, which meant that its 
legal advice, ordinarily binding on the executive branch, had been subjected to 
the scrutiny of at least three OLC attorneys, two of whom were senior supervis-
ing attorneys.  One aspect of the deliberative process worthy of special atten-
tion is the issue: deliberation by whom?  Notably, the historical examples of in-
terpretive independence most often cited by departmentalists involve the 
personal views of Presidents and members of Congress, including Thomas Jef-
ferson, Andrew Jackson, and Abraham Lincoln.103  The exercise of some presi-
dential powers, such as the veto and the pardon powers, require personal action 
and thus an element of personal deliberation.  Presidential authority to act on 
interpretations at odds with Supreme Court precedent, I would suggest, is en-
hanced when the President personally makes the final decision, rather than offi-
cials acting on his delegated authority.104 
2. Transparency 
The public release of OLC legal opinions generally promotes principled and 
high-quality legal analysis and also makes possible public accountability, which 
is of independent constitutional value.  Strong reasons for not releasing some 
material range from national security concerns to the chilling effect on those 
who seek advice on policy initiatives that may be abandoned based on legal ad-
vice.  Further, the details of what should be released are debatable.  Yet such 
legitimate differences do not explain the dramatic differences in practices 
among administrations regarding the public release of OLC opinions and other 
legal analyses.  This variation may be due in part simply to inattention, lack of 
external demands, and the relatively low priority assigned by some administra-
tions to openness in government.  Public disclosure is especially warranted 
when the executive branch takes official action premised on independent con-
stitutional views, rather than application of judicial precedent.  In such cases, 
absent exceedingly strong counterveiling factors, such as a threat to national se-
curity, the executive branch should release a detailed explanation to the public.  
Moreover, Congress and the public should exert pressure for such explanations 
 
 101. Harold Hongju Koh, Protecting the Office of Legal Counsel From Itself, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 
513, 514 (1993).  See generally Symposium, supra note 38. 
 102. Koh, supra note 101, at 514. 
 103. See supra note 65. 
 104. Presidential advisors obviously do not always agree, even when a President strongly sets the 
broad parameters of an independent legal agenda, as Ronald Reagan surely did.  See, e.g., CHARLES 
FRIED, ORDER AND LAW: ARGUING THE REAGAN REVOLUTION—A FIRSTHAND ACCOUNT (1991); 
DOUGLAS W. KMIEC, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S LAWYER: INSIDE THE MEESE JUSTICE 
DEPARTMENT (1992). 
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in appropriate circumstances.  Candor also is of great value regarding the gen-
eral standards and processes that govern executive branch interpretation in a 
given administration.105  Especially when Presidents seek to promote their con-
stitutional views and actively participate in the development of constitutional 
meaning, as President Reagan did, the other branches of government and the 
public should know of their general approach and of any official actions they 
take premised on independent views. 
3. Humility 
I would add to Professor Friedman’s call for historical humility that, just as 
academic theory must withstand “the crucible of very different circum-
stances,”106 Presidents and members of Congress should strive for humility re-
garding their own relative interpretive abilities: humility in the ultimate service 
of constitutional fidelity.  The ideal should reflect a willingness to live by the 
rules they establish even as power shifts to the other political party, as well as: a 
respect for the superior interpretive abilities and expertise of other branches, 
recognition of one’s own negative tendencies that might interfere with princi-
pled interpretation (such as tendencies toward self-aggrandizement and self-
protection), confidence in the assertion of principled views, and resistance to 
encroachments on interpretive authority.  Humility, too, should guide the 
Court’s determinations of what deference it should afford principled, candid po-
litical branch interpretations.107   When confronted with the assertion of an inde-
pendent view by Congress or the President, the Court typically should examine 
both the substantive merits of the position and the  actual  processes  employed 
to reach that interpretation.  This approach would be superior to the Rehnquist 
Court’s rote and often-hollow claims of adherence to the presumption that fed-
eral legislation is constitutional—a presumption that itself is premised on the of-
ten inaccurate assumption that Congress passes and the President signs legisla-
tion only after a determination of its constitutionality.108 
 
 105. See, e.g., sources cited supra notes 42 & 47. 
 106. Friedman, supra note 68, at 170. 
 107. Then-professor, now federal judge, Michael McConnell similarly called for “judicial humility:” 
[A]n essential element of responsible judging is a respect for the opinions and judgments of 
others, and a willingness to suspend belief, at least provisionally, in the correctness of one’s 
own opinions, especially when they conflict with the decisions of others who have, no less than 
judges, sworn an oath to uphold and defend the Constitution. 
Michael W. McConnell, The Importance of Humility in Judicial Review: A Comment on Ronald 
Dworkin’s “Moral Reading” of the Constitution, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1269, 1292 (1997).  One diffi-
culty in application, of course, is disagreement over what humility entails.  See William J. Brennan, Jr., 
Speech to the Text and Teaching Symposium, Georgetown University (Oct. 21, 1985), in THE GREAT 
DEBATE: INTERPRETING OUR WRITTEN CONSTITUTION 11, 14 (Federalist Soc’y ed., 1986) (“[I]n truth 
[originalism] is little more than arrogance cloaked as humility.”). 
 108. The Court’s 1819 decision in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819), provides 
one example of the Court favorably referencing deliberate and principled political branch interpreta-
tions: 
The power now contested was exercised by the first Congress elected under the present con-
stitution.  The bill for incorporating the bank of the United States did not steal upon an un-
suspecting legislature, and pass unobserved.  Its principle was completely understood, and was 
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4. Variability 
Presidential and congressional interpretive practice has varied signifi-
cantly—appropriately so—with the views of the officeholder.  Most Presidents 
have afforded relatively strong deference to the Court’s constitutional views, as 
well as to Congress’s views as evidenced by its enactment of legislation.  During 
the Clinton Administration, for example, OLC issued the following general 
guidance to executive branch agency general counsels: 
[T]he constitutional structure obligates the executive branch to adhere to settled judi-
cial doctrine that limits executive and legislative power.  While the Supreme Court’s 
decisions interpreting the Constitution cannot simply be equated with the Constitu-
tion, we are mindful of the special role of the courts in the interpretation of the law of 
the Constitution.109 
At the other extreme lies President Reagan’s at least theoretical support for 
broad executive independence and his administration’s alternative constitu-
tional vision and critique of numerous Supreme Court decisions as either “con-
sistent” or “ inconsistent” with that vision.110  Effecting sweeping constitutional 
change is only one of numerous possible presidential priorities, and nothing in 
the Constitution requires Presidents to place high on their lists resource-
intensive development of comprehensive constitutional views to compete with 
those of the Supreme Court.111  Variability across administrations does come at a 
potentially significant cost: significant imbalance might result from a pattern of 
Presidents of one political party (or ideology) consistently ranking constitu-
tional change a higher priority than Presidents of the other party.  The principal 
check, though, must be the American public, as it is generally on Presidents’ 
choices regarding priorities.  Presidents and members of Congress ordinarily do 
not violate their constitutional oaths by choosing to adhere to judicial prece-
 
opposed with equal zeal and ability.  After being resisted, first in the fair and open field of de-
bate, and afterwards in the executive cabinet, with as much persevering talent as any measure 
has ever experienced, and being supported by arguments which convinced minds as pure and 
as intelligent as this country can boast, it became a law.  The original act was permitted to ex-
pire; but a short experience of the embarrassments to which the refusal to revive it exposed 
the government, convinced those who were most prejudiced against the measure of its neces-
sity, and induced the passage of the present law. 
Id. at 401-02.  For discussions of the roles of all three branches in consideration of the constitutionality 
of a national bank and excerpts from relevant documents, see, e.g.,  BREST ET AL., PROCESSES OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING, supra note 100, at 7-60; Walter Dellinger & H. Jefferson Powell, 
The Constitutionality of the Bank Bill: The Attorney General’s First Constitutional Law Opinions, 44 
DUKE L.J. 110 (1994). 
 109. 1996 Dellinger Memorandum, supra note 42, at 517.  While the Clinton Administration was 
considerably more deferential to the constitutional views of the Court than, for example, the Reagan 
Administration, it did, on occasion, disagree with the Court.  See, e.g., id. at 558 n.116 (“The rationale 
of [Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349 (1958)] . . . seems questionable.”); id. at 560 (“[W]e believe 
that the executive branch should resist any further application of the Wiener rationale. . . .”). 
 110. See OLP, GUIDELINES, supra note 7. 
 111. By contrast, Professor Paulsen’s reading of the Take Care clause unrealistically would “de-
mand[] full legal review of all matters that come before [the President] to be ‘faithfully executed’; that 
is, executive review of the legal correctness of other branches’ actions.”  Paulsen, The Most Dangerous 
Branch, supra note 51, at 261-62.  For thoughtful discussions of the importance of balancing the costs of 
political branch deliberation against benefits, see Garrett & Vermeule, supra note 19; Schroeder, supra 
note 66. 
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dent.  When they do diverge from precedent, though, they should exercise their 
interpretive independence to best promote the Constitution through principled, 
high-quality, transparent constitutional decisionmaking. 
5. Attainability 
Finally, do the preceding four characteristics suggest an attainable system?  
While relatively few would argue with the goals of improved deliberation, ac-
countability, and humility, some strong incentives run in the opposite direction.  
All three branches of government possess incentives at times to minimize and 
malign congressional and presidential participation in shaping constitutional 
meaning.  Witness the debate over the appropriate role of prospective judges’ 
legal views in judicial selection and the charges of “politicization” of the proc-
ess, as well as the testimony of executive branch nominees seeking to reassure 
the Senate that their personal constitutional views are irrelevant.  In the end, 
these characteristics do provide realistic goals and, at minimum, helpful ideals 
to which we should aspire and attempt to hold our government officials.  For 
the executive branch, in particular, the structures and practices for principled 
constitutional interpretation already are in place, with the greatest need for im-
provement in the area of transparency.  Essential to success is public oversight.  
The Constitution itself provides incentives for the branches to regulate each 
other.112 Congress regularly demands detailed constitutional views of the execu-
tive branch113 and less frequently, information about the processes by which con-
stitutional interpretations were reached.  More interbranch constitutional de-
bate and demands of these sorts would improve political branch interpretation, 
as would increased awareness and attention by academics, the press, interest 
groups, and the public. 
IV 
FUNCTIONAL DEPARTMENTALISM APPLIED:  
ABORTION AND CONGRESSIONAL POWER 
Some of the most extensive analyses of political branch influences on consti-
tutional meaning focus on the issue of abortion.  Important separate works by 
Professors Neal Devins and Barry Friedman in particular examine abortion as 
illustrative of the dialogic nature of constitutional interpretation, with constitu-
tional meaning shaped by the interaction of judicial rulings and the political and 
 
 112. See generally TUSHNET, supra note 27, at 95-128 (discussing the “incentive-compatible Consti-
tution,” that is, the ways in which the Constitution is self-enforcing absent judicial review).  See also 
THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison) (“Ambition must be made to counteract ambition.  The in-
terest of the man must be connected with the constitutional rights of the place.”). 
 113. Congress requires the Attorney General to notify Congress if the Department of Justice has 
determined that a law is unconstitutional and therefore refuses to enforce or defend it in litigation.  See 
Department of Justice Appropriation Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-132, § 21, 93 
Stat. 1040, 1049-50 (1979); see also Johnsen, supra note 14, at 52-54 (discussing ways in which the proc-
esses of executive branch constitutional interpretations might be improved). 
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social responses to those rulings.114  Elected officials and advocacy groups clearly 
have not left the constitutional status of abortion to the courts since the Su-
preme Court purported to settle the matter in 1973.  Presidents and many 
members of Congress are among those who have made extraordinary efforts to 
overrule and narrow the reach of Roe v. Wade.115  Notwithstanding the Court’s 
declaration in its 1992 Casey decision of its authority to “speak before all oth-
ers” about constitutional meaning,116 the issue of abortion illustrates the power 
of nonjudicial influences.  Since Casey, the Rehnquist Court has rejected the 
value of multiple interpreters with greater clarity and vehemence, even as 
elected officials continue to challenge the Court’s abortion rulings.  Most strik-
ing is Congress’s enactment of the Partial Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003 
(PBABA),117 which made it a federal crime to perform certain types of abortions 
that were labeled “partial-birth abortions,” despite the Court’s 2000 ruling in 
Stenberg v. Carhart 118 invalidating a similar criminal ban. 
This concluding Part considers federal activity regarding abortion. Secon-
darily, it addresses Congress’s Section 5 authority, a potential source of con-
gressional power to regulate abortion and, since Casey, the context in which the 
Rehnquist Court most strongly has proclaimed interpretive supremacy.  The ex-
traordinary activity counter to Roe, and to reproductive liberty generally, has 
been within political branch authority.  With the notable exception of the 
PBABA, Congress and Presidents have challenged the Court primarily in two 
contexts: through the appointment of federal judges, and through the expres-
sion of views either to the Court or to the public.  Neither context directly re-
stricts abortion in ways counter to the Court’s doctrine.  In both, the arguments 
for interpretive independence are particularly strong, but that is true for the 
courts as well: the courts should not defer to governmental determinations and 
actions less protective of reproductive liberty than the courts believe constitu-
tionally required. 
 
 114. DEVINS, supra note 26, at 5 (“Roe ignited a constructive constitutional dialogue . . . .”); Fried-
man, supra note 26, at 583 (“[C]ourts interpret the Constitution, but they also facilitate and mold a so-
cietywide constitutional dialogue.”); see also BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, 2 WE THE PEOPLE: 
TRANSFORMATIONS 397-403 (1998); MARK A. GRABER, RETHINKING ABORTION: EQUAL CHOICE, 
THE CONSTITUTION, AND REPRODUCTIVE POLITICS (1996); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, ABORTION: THE 
CLASH OF ABSOLUTES (1990).  I consider here only federal political branch influences and recommend 
the sources cited in this footnote for discussions of the many nonjudicial influences on abortion, includ-
ing the critical roles played by social movements and state governments. 
 115. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 116. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 868 (1992). 
 117. Pub. L. No. 108-105, 117 Stat. 1201.  I do not evaluate here the far more extensive state gov-
ernmental action in opposition to the Court’s abortion decisions. 
 118. 530 U.S. 914.  Professor Devins has stressed that abortion activity quieted following Casey, 
which he interpreted as evidence that nonjudicial interpreters respected the Court’s rulings on abor-
tion.  DEVINS, supra note 26, at 8-9.  Devins certainly is correct that those who oppose abortion tailor 
their actions to what likely will succeed in the Court, but his assessment of the dialogue is more positive 
than my own.  A chief problem with the restrictions that the Court has upheld as a result of the interac-
tions Devins describes—restrictions such as parental consent requirements and prohibitions on the use 
of public funds and public hospitals—is that they disproportionately harm the least politically powerful 
women, poor women and young women.  The disparate impact of a complete overruling of Roe would 
be even greater. 
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One preliminary point: Under a functional departmentalist approach, the 
appropriate exercise of interpretive independence depends on context.  Any 
generalization across issues should thus proceed with care.  Particular care is 
warranted regarding abortion, which is a rich and often-discussed example pre-
cisely because it is an extraordinary legal, political, social, and moral issue that, 
in substantial ways, is not representative of how the political branches typically 
go about constitutional interpretation.  The unusual public attentiveness to 
abortion—through the press, interest groups, and political parties—elevates the 
accountability of elected officials.  Congress’s Section 5 authority poses far 
greater challenges for those who disagree with the Rehnquist Court’s rulings.  
Another obvious distinguishing characteristic of both abortion and congres-
sional power, at least under the Rehnquist Court, is that the Court closely scru-
tinizes many arguably unconstitutional actions of the political branches and 
provides detailed constitutional views.  Interpretive theory also must address 
the need for principled constitutional decisionmaking with regard to issues and 
contexts in which the political branches will not have the option of simply ap-
plying well-developed judicial doctrine, including issues of war powers and for-
eign affairs. 
A. Political Branch Influences 
Members of Congress and especially Presidents have at least considered the 
use of nearly the full range of their relevant constitutional powers to restrict 
abortion: the development of alternative constitutional theories and interpreta-
tions, the promotion of those views both through public debate and in litigation, 
the selection (and rejection) of federal judges based in significant part on their 
views on the constitutional status of reproductive liberty, congressional passage 
and presidential veto of legislation, executive branch regulations and policies, 
and even constitutional amendments.119  Political branch action regarding abor-
tion has not proceeded solely in policy terms or on the basis of asserted superi-
ority in relevant fact-finding, but has directly challenged the Court on the level 
of constitutional meaning.  President Ronald Reagan stands out among oppo-
nents of Roe, and abortion was a central issue in his administration’s more gen-
eral attack on the Court and its promotion of presidential interpretive inde-
pendence.120 
 
 119. See DEVINS, supra note 26, at 299 (“Each and every feature of the abortion dispute is domi-
nated by elected government action.”). 
 120. Charles Fried has written of his time as Solicitor General during the Reagan Administration: 
“The Reagan administration made Roe v. Wade the symbol of everything that had gone wrong in law, 
particularly in constitutional law.”  FRIED, supra note 104, at 72; see also KMIEC, supra note 104, at 72-
89 (discussing the Reagan Administration’s abortion policies, in a section entitled “Abortion: The Licit 
Murder of Family Members”); OLP, GUIDELINES, supra note 7, at 8 (“The so-called ‘right of privacy’ 
cases provide examples of judicial creation of rights not reasonably found in the Constitution.”); id. at 
82-83 (declaring the following, among many other Court decisions, “inconsistent” with the Reagan 
Administration’s constitutional views: Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (invalidating state law that 
criminalized the performance of abortion); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (invalidating 
state statute that criminalized the use of birth control devices); and Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 
(1942) (invalidating state statute that forced sterilization of certain “habitual” criminals)). 
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The Court’s 1992 decision in Planned Parenthood v. Casey121 is best known 
as the case in which the political branches failed in their attempt to change con-
stitutional meaning.  In an interview published in 2000, former Attorney Gen-
eral Meese cited the Court’s failure to overrule Roe as the greatest failure of the 
Reagan legal agenda.122  Less generally appreciated (though widely recognized 
among academics and advocates), Casey also represented a substantial partial 
victory for Presidents Reagan and Bush and an example of successful presiden-
tial efforts to change constitutional meaning: the Court substantially reduced 
the level of protection afforded women in their choices regarding abortion.  For 
all of its eloquence about the rule of law and the importance of reproductive 
choice, as well as its practical import in retaining a floor of constitutional pro-
tection, the Court expressly overruled in part its two most recent abortion cases 
City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc.123 and Thorn-
burgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists124by upholding 
a state-mandated waiting period indistinguishable from those it had invalidated 
in Akron and Thornburgh.  Most significantly, Casey replaced the fundamental 
right/strict judicial scrutiny standard, which essentially foreclosed government 
restrictions prior to the point of fetal viability, with a new, less protective “un-
due burden” standard that allows some pre-viability restrictions. 
Notably, it was President Reagan’s Solicitor General, Rex Lee, who first 
urged the Court to adopt the undue burden standard, in a brief filed in Akron.125  
The Court declined, and six Justices (down from seven in Roe) continued to ap-
ply strict scrutiny and recognize as fundamental the liberty to make abortion 
decisions free from governmental interference.  Justice O’Connor endorsed the 
undue burden standard in dissent,126 and a decade and four Reagan and Bush 
appointments later, the joint opinion of Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, and 
Souter in Casey adopted the undue burden standard.127  In the interim, the 
Reagan and Bush Administrations had filed five amicus curiae briefs urging the 
Court to go further and expressly overrule Roe.128  In the Court’s 2000 Stenberg 
decision, Justice Kennedy split with Justices O’Connor and Souter on how to 
apply the undue burden standard, and the Court invalidated a Nebraska “par-
tial birth abortion” ban by a vote of five to four.129  Presidential and congres-
 
 121. 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
 122. Edwin Meese III, Dialogue: Reagan’s Legal Revolutionary, 3 GREEN BAG 2D 193, 199 (2000). 
 123. 462 U.S. 416 (1983). 
 124. 476 U.S. 747 (1986). 
 125. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Akron (No. 81-746) 
[hereinafter United States Akron Brief]. 
 126. Akron, 462 U.S. at 463 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 127. Casey, 505 U.S. at 833. 
 128. Id. at 844 (noting that “the United States, as it has done in five other cases in the last decade, 
again asks us to overrule Roe”).  Rex Lee’s successor, Charles Fried, has written of his belief that if in 
the 1986 Thornburgh case he had wanted to argue for anything less than an express overruling of Roe, 
as Lee had by proposing the undue burden standard in Akron, “I would simply [have been] overruled.” 
FRIED, supra note 104, at 34.  Fried’s appointment as Solicitor General may have depended on his will-
ingness to urge the Court to overrule Roe.  Id. at 34-35. 
 129. Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000). 
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sional efforts to overrule Roe continue.  Despite Stenberg, Congress passed and 
President George W. Bush signed into law the PBABA,130 and President Bush 
has pledged to appoint “conservative” Justices like Justices Thomas and Scalia, 
who, along with Chief Justice Rehnquist, consistently have voted to expressly 
overrule Roe.131 
In affirming what it described as “Roe’s essential holding,”132 the joint opin-
ion in Casey offered one of its strongest statements of judicial supremacy: 
Like the character of an individual, the legitimacy of the Court must be earned over 
time. So, indeed, must be the character of a Nation of people who aspire to live ac-
cording to the rule of law.  Their belief in themselves as such a people is not readily 
separable from their understanding of the Court invested with the authority to decide 
their constitutional cases and speak before all others for their constitutional ideals.133 
In an extraordinarily open discussion about its motivations, the joint opinion in 
Casey justified its adherence to what it described as a “watershed” precedent134 
in part on the need to protect the Court’s legitimacy and appear principled in 
the public’s eye: “The Court must take care to speak and act in ways that allow 
people to accept its decisions on the terms the Court claims for them, as 
grounded truly in principle, not as compromises with social and political pres-
sures . . . .”135  Overruling Roe instead would have drawn attention in a politi-
cally explosive context to the role legal views on abortion had played in Reagan 
and Bush’s appointments to the Court. 
The irony in the joint opinion’s explanation for its decisionthe need to 
avoid the appearance that it was responding to public pressure—is obvious.  
Moreover, there is no question that opposition to Roe by Presidents Reagan 
and Bushand the appointment of Justices who shared that opposi-
tionresulted in the Court’s decision in Casey to replace strict scru-
tiny/fundamental rights analysis with the far less protective undue burden stan-
dard.  The  opinion studiously downplayed the significance of this change and 
did not expressly apply the principles of stare decisis, so fully discussed and 
carefully applied with regard to Roe, to the two cases and the standard of re-
view that the Court essentially overruled. 
 
 130. Pub. L. No. 108-105, 117 Stat. 1201 (2003). 
 131. Neil A. Lewis & David Johnston, Bush Would Sever Law Group’s Role in Screening Judges, 
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 2001, at A1.  Just days after the November 2002 election gave Republicans con-
trol of both houses of Congress (in addition to the presidency), prospective Senate majority leader 
Trent Lott promised a federal law criminalizing so-called partial birth abortions.  Dana Milbank, Lott’s 
Promise to Bring Up Abortion Worries Bush Aides, WASH. POST, Nov. 12, 2002, at A23; see also Edito-
rial, The War Against Women, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 2003, at A14 (“The lengthening string of anti-choice 
executive orders, regulations, legal briefs, legislative maneuvers and key appointments emanating from 
[President George W. Bush’s] administration suggests that undermining the reproductive freedom es-
sential to women’s health, privacy and equality is a major preoccupation of his administration—second 
only, perhaps, to the war on terrorism.”). 
 132. Casey, 505 U.S. at 846. 
 133.  Id. at 868 (emphasis added). 
 134. Id. at 867 (“[O]nly the most convincing justification under accepted standards of precedent 
could suffice to demonstrate that a later decision overruling the first was anything but a surrender to 
political pressure . . . .”). 
 135. Id. at 865. 
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The Court followed its strong assertion of interpretive supremacy in Ca-
seythere, as the grounds for maintaining some protection for reproductive 
libertywith decisions in Boerne,136 Kimel,137 and Garrett138 placing limits on 
Congress’s Section 5 power to protect individual rights.    The Court was right in 
Casey to uphold Roe based upon stare decisis, but its broad assertions of judicial 
supremacy were unnecessary to that holding: the decision of a Justice to uphold 
a landmark decision like Roe despite personal disagreement can be an act of ju-
dicial humility, a recognition that an issue of this importance and contention re-
garding an individual right should not vary with the individuals who happen to 
sit on the Court at the time, some of whom were appointed in part because of 
their views on this very issue.139 
The Court’s approach in Casey was a strong assertion of judicial supremacy 
in the service of preserving some core of a “watershed” decision that protected 
an embattled, politically divisive individual right from legislative infringement.  
Casey by no means mandated the Court’s later decisions invalidating congres-
sional attempts to enhance federal rights protection (specifically for religious 
liberty and against age and disability discrimination).140  Nor did it require the 
Court’s failure to recognize in those cases that Congress is capable of contribut-
ing to principled constitutional interpretation.  These later decisions, more 
clearly even than Casey, represent presidential success in transforming constitu-
tional meaning.  They, too, resulted directly from a Reagan-initiated campaign, 
this time to diminish Congress’s power and enhance “states’ rights,” including 
through the development of constitutional theories and the appointment of Jus-
tices who would adopt those theories.141 
Efforts by Congress to legislate concerning abortion—whether to restrict or 
protect lawful abortion—thus confront not only the undue burden test, but also 
the Court’s view that congressional efforts to define constitutional meaning 
contrary to the Court’s interpretations violate the separation of powers.  The 
Court’s insistence that it is illegitimate for Congress to attempt to define the 
scope of the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantees strengthens existing incen-
tives for Congress to base abortion legislation instead on its commerce power 
and to thus disguise both the purpose and effect of laws that regulate abortion, 
as it subsequently did with the PBABA.  
Despite the wide-ranging activity hostile to Roe, the specific ways in which 
the political branches have asserted independent views fare well under a func-
 
 136. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
 137. Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000). 
 138. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001). 
 139. See ACKERMAN, supra note 114, at 399 (stating that if the Court had overruled Roe and subse-
quent “pro-Roe nominees made it to the Court . . . the result would have been a decade of jurispruden-
tial crisis as a new 5-to-4 majority overruled Casey’s 5-to-4 overruling of Roe—leading perhaps to an 
effort by the next President to reverse the reversal”). 
 140. See supra notes 136-138. 
 141. At the same time that Meese cited abortion as the “most disappointing loss” on the Reagan 
legal agenda, he cited the Rehnquist Court’s congressional power and federalism decisions as among 
the Reagan Administration’s greatest successes in moving the law.  Meese, supra note 122, at 199. 
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tional departmentalist approach.  With regard to the first suggested principle of 
interbranch respect for constitutional functions, Presidents notably have not 
acted on independent views in the exercise of the two presidential powers that 
would raise serious separation of powers issues: a presidential refusal to comply 
with a judicial order or a duly enacted federal statute.  With the exception of 
the PBABA, the powers Presidents and Congress actually have exercised to 
oppose the Court—primarily voicing opposition to Roe and appointing judges 
based on their legal views—did not prevent another branch of government 
“from accomplishing its constitutionally assigned functions.”142  To be clear, 
Presidents and Congress have restricted abortion in ways other than advocacy 
and judicial appointments, and some of those actions were at least arguably 
constitutionally objectionable.143  But whatever one’s view of the constitutional 
merits of the substance of political branch opposition to Roe, almost all past 
manifestations have been consistent with the Constitution’s allocation of federal 
authority. 
Almost all past assertions of independent views also seem constitutionally 
authorized when evaluated with regard to my second suggested principle: the 
promotion of the Constitution through interpretive quality.  Again, the federal 
ban on partial birth abortions constitutes the notable exception.  Because abor-
tion is an issue of exceptional public and political interest, elected officials typi-
cally feel compelled to formulate their own positions—constitutional as well as 
religious and moral—rather than simply declare that it is an issue for the Court 
to decide.  That same public attention and pressure, facilitated by the press, in-
terest groups,  and political parties,  helps ensure that elected officials and  can-
didates for public office announce detailed views on abortion and settle on 
those views personally, thereby promoting deliberativeness and transparency.  
Humility, in my view, counsels particularly strong deference to the Court in the 
protection of rights and counsels against judicial deference to the political 
branches.  When, though, elected officials are candid with the public about their 
constitutional views on abortion, they do not act beyond their interpretive au-
thority when they advocate those views before the courts and the public or ap-
point Justices in part based on those views.  The proper response of the courts, 
and of the Senate with regard to judicial nominees (and generally of the three 
branches with regard to each other), is to continue to safeguard and uphold 
rights consistent with their own interpretations of the Constitution. 
The one aspect of interpretive quality in which the political branches (and 
the Court) have not fared particularly well is public transparency and candor 
regarding the processes of constitutional interpretation, both generally and also 
with specific regard to abortion.  The American public cannot help but know of 
 
 142. Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977). 
 143. I would cite the imposition of funding restrictions and what is commonly described as the abor-
tion counseling Title X “gag rule,” though on both the Court ultimately agreed with the President and 
Congress and upheld the restrictions.  See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991); Harris v. McRae, 448 
U.S. 297 (1980).  See generally DEVINS, supra note 26, at 78-120. 
08_JOHNSEN_FINALFMT.DOC 11/16/2004  12:21 PM 
Summer 2004] FUNCTIONAL DEPARTMENTALISM 141 
the continued political assaults on the supremacy of the courts regarding abor-
tion.  And yet, even here, officials in all three branches of the government at 
times obfuscate and deny the roles played by Congress and the President in 
shaping constitutional meaning.  Judicial appointments provide the clearest ex-
ample.  Accusations that the Senate’s consideration of nominees’ legal views 
improperly politicizes the law are made in the face of presidential pledges to 
remake the Court along the lines of its most ideologically conservative members 
and claims that “philosophy” but not “ideology” should matter.144  That Justices 
appointed by Presidents Reagan and George H.W. Bush authored the Casey 
joint opinion is cited as evidence of both judicial independence and the need for 
more careful ideological screening of nominees in the future.  The Rehnquist 
Court’s opinions that denigrate nonjudicial constitutional interpretation and 
diminish congressional power also threaten to add to public misunderstanding 
about constitutional change and to exacerbate existing incentives for the politi-
cal branches to disclaim responsibility for constitutional interpretation. 
Positions taken by John Ashcroft on the PBABA illustrate the range of in-
terpretive authority government officials may claim—from strong departmenta-
lism to strong judicial supremacy, even on a single issue—and expose some of 
the pressures to deny existing interpretive authority.  Then-Senator John Ash-
croft urged the Senate to override President Clinton’s veto of a ban on so-called 
“partial birth abortions.” Ashcroft not only strongly disagreed with the Court’s 
abortion decisions, but he advocated a strong view of congressional interpretive 
independence and authority to legislate based on views at odds with Supreme 
Court precedent.  He testified about his belief, contrary to Roe, that the Four-
teenth Amendment protects the right to life of the fetus, and that Congress’s 
Section 5 authority therefore supported enactment of the federal ban: 
“[A]llowing this life-taking procedure to continue would be inconsistent with 
our obligation under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to protect life.”145 
Yet as the President’s nominee to serve as Attorney General, Ashcroft 
sought to minimize the extent of his prospective interpretive authority.  During 
his Senate confirmation hearing, Ashcroft sought to reassure the committee 
that, as Attorney General, he would not be in a position to act on his own con-
stitutional views.  In response to questions about how he would advise President 
Bush on the PBABA, Ashcroft testified that he would be bound by the Court’s 
abortion decisions, which he described as “settled law,” thereby implying that 
he might recommend President Bush veto the law.146  Not only did President 
Bush sign the federal abortion ban, but Ashcroft’s Department of Justice had 
 
 144. See, e.g., The Judicial Nomination and Confirmation Process: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on 
Admin. Oversight and the Courts of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Congr. (2001); 149 CONG. 
REC. S14528 (2003) (thirty-nine hour filibuster regarding judicial selection). 
 145. 144 CONG. REC. S10491 (1998).  Ashcroft further stated, “I expect those defending the Presi-
dent’s veto will say that opponents of partial birth abortion are really against all abortions. Well, Mr. 
President, I cannot speak for other Senators, but on that charge, I plead guilty.” Id. 
 146. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John Ashcroft to be Attorney General of the United 
States, Hearing before the Senate Judiciary Comm., 107th Cong. 207 (2001). 
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earlier filed a brief in support of the constitutionality of a similar state law.147  
Ashcroft’s positions, one strongly departmentalist and the other strongly judi-
cially supremacist, are not necessarily entirely contradictory, for he spoke first 
as a Senator and then as a prospective Attorney General.  Nor was he the first 
nominee to seek to reassure a potentially hostile Senate by minimizing his pro-
spective authority.  But it is striking that Senators did not do more to challenge 
Ashcroft, which might reflect the lack of a shared understanding of the interpre-
tive authority and power of Presidents and their advisors, notwithstanding our 
nation’s recent experience with the Reagan/Meese campaign to remake consti-
tutional law.  On issues of constitutional interpretation, the politically account-
able branches are inadequately so. 
B. Legislation Premised on Political Branch Disagreement with the Court 
The enactment of the PBABA presents the issue of political branch inter-
pretive independence in an especially complicated and contentious context.  
Congress passed, and President Bush signed into law, restrictions on abortion 
difficult to distinguish from those the current Court had held unconstitutional 
just three years earlier.148  No intervening change in the Court’s composition or 
doctrine suggests that the Court will decide the issue differently.149  It is instruc-
tive to think about the PBABA in connection with the Freedom of Choice Act 
(FOCA), federal legislation introduced, but never enacted, that would have ex-
panded protection for reproductive liberty.150  The FOCA is similar in this re-
spect to some rights-protective statutory provisions the Rehnquist Court has 
found beyond Congress’s Section 5 authority.151  The FOCA first was introduced 
in 1989,152 when it seemed likely that the Court would go further than it thus far 
has to diminish judicial protection for reproductive liberty.  Indeed, the Court’s 
 
 147. Brief for the United States of America as Amicus Curiae Supporting Reversal, Women’s Med. 
Prof’l Corp. v. Taft, 353 F.3d 436 (6th Cir. 2003) (No. 01-4124). 
 148. Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000). 
 149. Congress purports to avoid this outcome by making a series of factual findings that it declares 
are superior to those found by the courts in Stenberg.  See generally Michael Stokes Paulsen, Abrogat-
ing Stare Decisis by Statute: May Congress Remove the Precedential Effect of Roe and Casey? 109 YALE 
L.J. 1535 (2000). 
 150. See, e.g., S. 25, 103rd Cong. (1993); S. 1912, 101st Cong. (1989). 
 151. See Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001) (Americans with Disabilities 
Act); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000) (Age Discrimination in Employment Act); City 
of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (Religious Freedom Restoration Act). 
 152. See S. 1912, 101st Cong. (1989).  Even before Roe v. Wade, members of Congress considered 
federal statutory protection for abortion.  In 1970 Senator Bob Packwood introduced the National 
Abortion Act, which would have legalized abortion nationwide (and preempted inconsistent state laws) 
by setting a national standard strikingly similar to the standard the Court adopted three years later.  117 
CONG. REC. 13,155-56 (1971).  The National Abortion Act would have authorized physicians to per-
form abortions prior to twenty weeks of pregnancy, a point chosen to “make absolutely certain that 
there would be no abortion of a viable fetus,” and after that point when the physician determined that 
to continue the pregnancy would likely endanger the health or life of the woman.  Id.  Senator Pack-
wood indicated initial concern about Congress’s authority to bind the states in this manner, but ulti-
mately concluded Congress had the authority to protect the fundamental right to privacy, “one of our 
most precious and basic constitutional guarantees.”  116 CONG. REC. 12,672 (1970). 
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1989 decision in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services153 suggested that the 
Court was at most one judicial appointment away from overruling Roe and al-
lowing states to criminalize abortion.154  The FOCA originally was drafted to 
preserve Roe’s “strict scrutiny” level of protection, and then was redrafted after 
Casey to take account of the Court’s new “undue burden” test.  The ultimate 
aim, though, remained unchanged: to preserve as a statutory matter the level of 
constitutional protection the Court afforded abortion beginning with Roe155 
through its 1986 decision in Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians 
and Gynecologists.156  Thus, both versions sought to invalidate state laws that the 
Court would uphold as constitutional. 
My aim here is not to assess comprehensively the constitutionality of the 
PBABA and the FOCA.  Even under the Rehnquist Court’s new limits, the 
Court likely would (and should) find that Congress possesses the affirmative au-
thority to enact both pieces of legislation pursuant to the commerce clause.  
Rather, I consider here only the counter-factual question: If Section 5 were 
Congress’s only arguable basis for legislative authority, would Congress exceed 
that authority—and, as suggested by the Rehnquist Court, violate the constitu-
tional separation of powers—by enacting legislation premised on a view of con-
stitutional meaning that conflicts with the Court’s precedent?  This question, of 
course, would not exhaust assessment of the law’s constitutionality.  Even if 
Congress does not encroach on judicial power by enacting a law premised on 
independent constitutional views, the law might unconstitutionally infringe on 
protected constitutional rights (as in the case of the PBABA) or constitutional 
structures (such as federalism). 
For example, Congress drafted the FOCA as an exercise of both its com-
merce power and its Section 5 authority, and President George H.W. Bush op-
posed it on federalism and other grounds.157  If enacted, would the FOCA en-
croach on judicial power by redefining liberty to invalidate state restrictions the 
Court has upheld, or should its constitutionality depend instead on a direct as-
sessment of possible federalism objections?  Professors Robert Post and Reva 
Siegel emphasize the importance of this distinction in their analysis of Con-
gress’s Section 5 authority to enact the Family and Medical Leave Act.158  Post 
and Siegel argue convincingly that the Court’s “enforcement model” of Section 
5, with its new congruence and proportionality test, “is not healthy doctrine” 
because it hides the Court’s true federalism concerns behind a faulty conception 
of separation of powers.159    The Court, by “hijacking doctrinal formulations  
 
 153. 492 U.S. 490 (1989). 
 154. See TRIBE, supra note 114, at 172-92 (describing events leading up to the introduction of the 
Freedom of Choice Act of 1989). 
 155. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 156. 476 U.S. 747 (1986).  See generally Comm. on Labor & Human Res., The Freedom of Choice 
Act of 1993, S. REP. NO. 103-42 (1993). 
 157. See supra note 81 and accompanying text. 
 158. Post & Siegel, Policentric Interpretation of the FMLA, supra note 15. 
 159. Id. at 2050. 
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designed for completely different purposes,” avoids speaking candidly to the 
true constitutional issues.160  The Court thereby enhances its own power at Con-
gress’s expense, while diminishing the possibility of public understanding and 
accountability. 
Under the first of the two functional departmentalist principles—
interbranch respect for constitutional functions—neither the PBABA nor the 
FOCA would prevent the Court “from accomplishing its constitutionally as-
signed functions,”161 either as each statue was drafted or even if they had been 
more expressly premised on a repudiation of the Court’s constitutional views.  
The Court would remain free to invalidate the laws to the extent that they con-
flict with what the Court believes to be the best interpretation of the Constitu-
tion.  The second principle presents serious difficulty for the PBABA:  What do 
Congress and the President contribute to constitutional interpretive quality 
through the enactment of this law?  Not much, it seems to me. The only claim 
the law makes regarding its constitutionality is its factual finding, contrary to 
that of the courts, that the prohibited procedures never are medically indicated 
and, in fact, threaten women’s health.  Absent a sincere belief in this controver-
sial and extreme position, President Bush and members of Congress would have 
difficulty identifying a constitutional justification for their knowing infringe-
ment on a constitutional right recently declared by the Court; their support for 
the law otherwise would seem politically driven and manipulative rather than 
constitutionally principled, deliberative, and transparent. 
The constitutional analysis is complicated, though, by the Court’s role in 
discouraging constitutional dialogue and candor in lawmaking through its decla-
rations of strong judicial supremacy, as the enactment history of the PBABA 
illustrates.  John Yoo has written about advice he gave as general counsel to the 
Senate Judiciary Committee, prior to the Court’s 2000 Stenberg decision,162 re-
garding the relative advantages of two possible approaches to a proposal by 
“opponents of abortion (including Chairman Hatch)” to criminalize the per-
formance of so-called “partial birth abortions.”163  The Department of Justice 
had advised Congress of the Office of Legal Counsel’s determination that the 
bill was unconstitutional (consistent with the Supreme Court’s subsequent hold-
ing in Stenberg).164  Yoo advised (again, prior to Stenberg) that the Senate had 
two justifications for nevertheless enacting the legislation.  First, Congress could 
assert a strong departmentalist approach to Congress’s right to interpret the 
Constitution as it believed best: Congress simply could disagree, for example, 
with the Court’s declared view that women’s health was paramount, and decide 
it preferred the reasoning of the Court’s dissenters.165  The availability of a sec-
 
 160. Id. at 2050-51. 
 161. Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977). 
 162. 530 U.S. 914 (2000). 
 163. Yoo, supra note 49, at 7. 
 164. See id. at 8-9. 
 165. Id. (“Congress could reach its own interpretations of the Constitution and could decide, if it 
wished, to enforce it rather than the doctrines of the Supreme Court.”). 
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ond possible approach, though, made unnecessary “[s]uch an aggressive use of 
Congress’s authority to interpret the Constitution.”166  Congress instead could 
fashion the bill as within the Court’s relevant precedent by either adding a 
health exception or finding evidence that one was not necessary.167  Yoo advised 
that the second approach was politically preferable because poll results demon-
strated that most Americans did not want the Court to overrule Roe, but would 
support a ban on procedures described as “partial birth abortions.”168  The 
PBABA’s text and legislative history follow Yoo’s advice and take an addi-
tional step: Extensive factual findings comprise most of the bill’s text, declaring 
not only that the banned procedures are medically unnecessary, but that they 
actually endanger women’s health and lives. 
With the PBABA, Congress purported not to challenge the Court’s views 
on constitutional meaning—which would have been a losing strategy in the 
Court after Garrett169—and instead described its disagreement as merely a fac-
tual one, regarding which Congress claimed to possess superior fact-finding 
ability.  The Court’s adoption of the undue burden standard creates possibilities 
for legislative (and lower court) fact-finding that reaches conclusions that differ 
from those of the Court with regard to similar restrictions.  Solicitor General 
Rex Lee described the standard, in advocating for it in the 1983 Akron case, as 
“appropriately deferential” to legislatures’ “superior fact-finding capabilities:” 
Because the legislature has superior fact-finding capabilities, is directly responsible to 
the public for its resolution of the policy issues it treats, and has greater flexibility than 
the courts to fine-tune and redirect its efforts if a particular solution is ill-founded or 
unwise, the courts should test the constitutionality of legislation impacting upon the 
abortion choice by an appropriately deferential standard.170 
Both the PBABA and the FOCA were drafted to avoid a direct confrontation 
with the Court over constitutional meaning and also to comply with the theory, 
which the Rehnquist Court continues to endorse, albeit in a more limited form, 
that Congress possesses some authority to reach certain kinds of constitutional 
conclusions that differ from those the Court has reached.  The FOCA was re-
drafted after Casey to follow the undue burden standard and to include con-
gressional findings, contrary to the Court’s factual determination in Casey, that, 
for example, mandatory waiting periods do constitute an undue burden in prac-
tice.171  After Hibbs, and given the heightened scrutiny the Court continues to 
 
 166. Id. at 9. 
 167. Congress therefore could “interject its own interpretation without challenging the whole struc-
ture of abortion rights.” Id.  Yoo premised his advice also on his interpretation of the bill’s vague defi-
nition of the banned procedure as limited to post-viability abortions, when the Court has held the gov-
ernment’s interest in the potential life of the fetus is greatest.  The Committee Reports make clear a 
contrary intent, to ban as well pre-viability abortions.  See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 104-267, at 9 (1995). 
 168. Yoo, supra note 49, at 9. 
 169. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001). 
 170. United States Akron Brief, supra note 125, at 5. 
 171. While the aim of the Reagan Administration was to allow greater limits on abortion, the undue 
burden standard allows Congress and lower courts also to invalidate restrictions similar to those that 
the Supreme Court has upheld.  In addition to the FOCA, see A Woman’s Choice—East Side 
Women’s Clinic v. Newman, 132 F. Supp. 2d 1150 (S.D. Ind. 2001), rev’d, 305 F.3d 684 (7th Cir. 2002). 
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apply to abortion restrictions, the FOCA should satisfy the Rehnquist Court’s 
requirement of a “congruence and proportionality between the injury to be 
prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end.”172  A similar argu-
ment is not available for the PBABA, which the Court likely will, and should, 
invalidate, upon close scrutiny of the law’s factual findings. 
What if Congress had proceeded instead on a more aggressive departmen-
talist theory (such as that noted, but not recommended, by Yoo) and had 
drafted and enacted the PBABA—or the FOCA—expressly premised on an 
understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of liberty that di-
rectly conflicted with the Court’s precedent?  Should that change affect the con-
stitutional analysis?  Assume that the PBABA, in addition to its findings re-
garding the lack of need for a health exception and lack of burden, contained a 
statement of purpose along the lines of then-Senator Ashcroft’s testimony, that 
Congress was acting to enforce the right to life of the fetus under the Four-
teenth Amendment.  Or what if Congress had expressed a different, less expan-
sive conception of women’s reproductive liberty than the Court?  Or assume 
that Congress enacted the FOCA, with all of its findings regarding why waiting 
periods and other restrictions constitute undue burdens, but also with a state-
ment that Congress believed that Casey was wrongly decided and that the Court 
should not have replaced Roe’s strict scrutiny standard with the Casey undue 
burden standard. 
Such statements of congressional views directly rejecting the Court’s de-
clared view of constitutional meaning alone could not be said, even by the 
Rehnquist Court, to usurp judicial power.  But the Court’s Section 5 doctrine 
suggests that the inclusion of such statements increases the likelihood that the 
Court would invalidate the law as an unconstitutional attempt to “alter” consti-
tutional meaning as declared by the Court.173  The very purpose behind the 
Court’s development of the congruence and proportionality test was to ferret 
out congressional efforts at autonomous constitutional interpretation, under the 
guise of enforcement.174  If Congress asserts that it is, in fact, legislating based on 
a different view of constitutional meaning, the Rehnquist Court might conclude 
it has all the information it needs to declare a separation of powers violation. 
The Court should not count as a strike against a law’s constitutionality ef-
forts by Congress and the President to contribute meaningfully to constitutional 
debate through express disagreement with the Court.  Instead, the Court’s con-
stitutional assessment typically should focus on the merits of the law’s effects on 
constitutional rights and other constitutional structures and interests.175   Judicial 
 
 172. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997), discussed in Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. 
Hibbs,  538 U.S. 721, 722 (2003). 
 173. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 519. 
 174. Id. 
 175. That is not to say that expressions of political branch disagreement with the  Court’s constitu-
tional interpretations should never be relevant to judicial review.  Sincere and convincing factual find-
ings by Congress regarding what constitutes undue burdens on the choice of abortion, for example, 
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review should reflect the judiciary’s special role in protecting individual consti-
tutional rights from majority infringement.  Conversely, when the political 
branches choose to provide enhanced protection to individual rights, even when 
premised on their independent views of constitutional meaning, the courts 
should afford their judgments far greater deference.  Regardless, though, of 
one’s views on such contested issues, judicial doctrine and interpretive theory 
should recognize the great value in encouraging candor in government action by 
all three branches. 
V 
CONCLUSION 
A review of political branch influences on the constitutional status of abor-
tion underscores the need for humility and consistency in theorizing about in-
terpretive authority.  Most presidential and congressional efforts have aimed to 
restrict or criminalize abortion, and the Supreme Court has served as the pri-
mary protector of reproductive liberty.  A functional departmentalist approach 
that recognizes as legitimate substantial political branch interpretive independ-
ence therefore may seem to favor opponents of Roe.  A broader view beyond 
abortion, though, strongly suggests that efforts at increasing the quality, ac-
countability, and legitimacy in the public’s eye of political branch interpretation 
would better safeguard individual liberty and equality, as well as the fundamen-
tal features of the constitutional structure, than would dependence on one 
branch (namely, the Court) that has not consistently been at the forefront of the 
protection of individual rights.  All three branches of the federal government 
play critical roles in rights protection that should be acknowledged and under-
stood.   Regarding abortion, supporters of Roe came to appreciate the risks of 
sole reliance on the Court as the seven Justice majority in Roe dwindled to a 
bare five-to-four majority in the 1986 Thornburgh decision, and subsequent ap-
pointments signaled the strong possibility the Court would overrule Roe.  On 
many vital issues—war powers, national security, foreign affairs, terrorism, and 
the protection of individual rights in all of these contexts—the courts at best 
provide limited checks on the political branches’ determinations about what the 
Constitution requires.  Improvements in the processes of political branch consti-
tutional decisionmaking are imperative.  Equally important, the courts should 
not denigrate the authority of Congress and the President to voice and, when 
appropriate, act upon their constitutional views, but instead should focus on the 
merits of the constitutional issues presented.  Public discourse similarly should 
debate competing substantive visions of our Constitution.176 
 
generally should be more persuasive to the Court than a simple declaration that Congress believes the 
undue burden standard is an inappropriate constitutional standard. 
 176. See generally Balkin & Levinson, supra note 96. 
